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THE FORUM GAME
DEBRA LYN BASSETT*

One of the more interesting contradictions in law is the common
description of litigation as a "game," while simultaneously decrying
"game playing" in the litigation process. Litigation involves
strategic choice, as game theory illustrates. One of those strategic
choices includes the plaintiffs initial selection of the forum, which
the defendant may attempt to counter through transfer strategies of
its own. Criticizing and trivializing forum selection through the
label of forum "shopping" misapprehends the forum game by
treating forum selection as a parlor trick-as unfair and abusiverather than as a lawful, authorized strategy. Forum shopping is not
a form of "cheating" by those who refuse to play by the rules.
Playing by the rules includes the ability of plaintiffs counsel to
select-and the ability of defendant's counsel to attempt to
counter-the set of rules by which the litigation "game" will be
played.
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INTRODUCTION

One of the more interesting contradictions in law is the common
description of litigation as a "game," while simultaneously decrying
"game playing." The description of litigation as a "game" can be
used to trivialize the choices made, but a "game" is neither
necessarily frivolous' nor an object of contempt z One definition of
"game" is "[a] (form of) contest played according to rules and

1. See AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 3-4 (2d ed. 2004)
(noting that "[t]he word game may convey an impression that the subject is frivolous or
unimportant," but that games arise in many areas, including "business, politics, diplomacy,
and wars"); id. at 20 (noting that "[g]ames of strategy arise in many different contexts").
2. The analogy to a "game" can indicate either respect or disparagement; definitions
of "game" encompass both extremes. "Game" is defined as "[almusement, fun, play ...
[a]n object of ridicule," and as "[a] simulation of a contest, battle, operation, etc., in order
to test a strategy." See 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1057
(Lesley Brown ed. 1993) [hereinafter OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY].
Similarly,
synonyms for the word "game" encompass the range from "competition," "strategy," and
"plan," to "prank" and "kidding around." J.I. RODALE, THE SYNONYM FINDER 450
(1978).
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decided by skill, strength, or luck."3 Another definition is "to act
according to the rules of a game ... to behave as fairness or custom
requires. '
Litigation generally, and forum shopping specifically, are
"games" in the respectful sense of the word. Litigation is a form of
competition in which one's success is not assured. As an initial
matter, litigation is not decided solely upon the lawyer's skill; the
underlying merits of the case matter. In addition, investigation,
research, planning, organization, intelligence, skill, and strategy all
have roles in litigation, and a litigation outcome can turn on any of
these factors-locating an eyewitness (investigation), finding a
potentially persuasive case (research), anticipating weaknesses in
evidence presentation (planning), meeting or missing a deadline
(organization), creating a novel legal argument (intelligence), crossexamining a witness skillfully (skill), or selecting a favorable initial
forum (or moving for transfer) (strategy). "Cheating"-dishonest,
unethical, illegal, or unauthorized action-certainly can and does
happen in litigation, as in other games. However, forum shopping, as
a general concept, is not an example of such "cheating." Rather, as
this Article will show, forum shopping is a legitimate, expressly
authorized action when more than one forum satisfies the requisite
legal criteria.
The title of this Article, The Forum Game, has multiple
meanings. Law generally5 and litigation in particular 6 are sometimes
referred to as a kind of game; lawyers who engage in forum shopping
are accused of playing games;7 and critics assert that forum shopping
3. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
4. Id.
5. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on
Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 307 (1996) ("The practice of law is becoming a game
6. See Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting the cynical belief that "litigation is a mere game"); Howard M. Erichson, A
Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1780 (2005) (referring
to "the high-stakes game of mass tort litigation").
7. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of ForumShopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1995) ("The name of the game is forumshopping."); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2162, 2259 (2002) (referring to forum shopping as "gam[ing] the process"); Margo
E.K. Reder, Punitive Damages as a Necessary Remedy in Broker-Customer Securities
Arbitration Cases, 29 IND. L. REV. 105, 127 n.189 (1995) (noting that choice of law clauses
often "degenerate into a game of forum-shopping"); Linda J. Silberman, Developments in
Jurisdictionand Forum Non-Conveniens in InternationalLitigation: Thoughts on Reform
and a Proposalfor a Uniform Standard, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 501, 529 (1993) (referring to

"forum shopping games").
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trivializes our system of justice, thereby turning justice into a mere
game.8 Moreover, and perhaps most significantly, to the extent that
strategy and choice play a role in litigation, forum shopping
encompasses both, and thereby implicates important economic
theories of decisionmaking, including rational choice and game
theory. The notion of "game" is central and crucial to forum
shopping. "Game" and "forum shopping" invoke the same notions of
"competition," "strategy," and "rules"-the idea that one actively
plans, thinks ahead, and strategizes within the parameters of the rules
in order to prevail. Rather than thoughtlessly and apathetically filing
in the first available forum, forum shopping requires research,
appraisal, reflection, and thought. Key to the understanding of the
appropriate role of forum shopping, however, is a foundational
premise: playing by the rules includes the ability of plaintiff's counsel
to select which set of rules and the ability of defense counsel to try to
counter that choice. Accordingly, disparaging remarks about forum
shopping-implying that the practice is a form of cheating because a
litigant is attempting to circumvent the rules-misapprehend the
"rules." The rules in litigation include the plaintiff's ability to choose
which set of rules will govern the game. Accordingly, forum shopping
is a strategy for the purpose of finding the most favorable set of rules
for litigation.
Despite the frequent availability of a choice in selecting a forum
due to the existence of more than one lawfully authorized forum,
"forum shopping" is undeniably a pejorative term. No less an
authority than a United States Supreme Court Justice has denounced
forum shopping as "evil." 9 Congressional efforts to limit forum
shopping have portrayed the practice as abusive, devious, and

8. See Thomas F. Geraghty, Prisons and After Prison, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1149, 1152-53 (2004) (book review) ("[Criminal offenders] viewed the

criminal justice system as a 'game' in which 'no one was concerned about' justice, truth,
helping offenders, or even exacting punishment for crimes committed. Everybody was out
to get the 'best deal,' and the deal you got had little to do with what you did."); J. Thomas
Greene, Meeting Some Current Challenges to Our Legal Profession by the Way We
Practice Law, 222 F.R.D. 201, 201 (2004) ("[T]he public has gained 'the impression that
the administration of justice is but a game.' "); Manuel Berrelez et al., Note, Disappearing
Dilemmas: Judicial Construction of Ethical Choice as Strategic Behavior in the Criminal
Defense Context, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 225, 259 (2005) (noting that some "view the
criminal justice system as a game where all tactics are fair play as long as they help
produce the desired verdict").
9. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 521 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)

(referring to forum shopping as "the type of evil aimed at in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins
[304 U.S. 64 (1938)]"); see infra notes 75-108 and accompanying text (discussing Erie and
its ramifications).
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unethical."
One news report regarding proposed legislation
described forum shopping as "the notorious practice by which
personal injury attorneys cherry-pick courts and bring lawsuits in
jurisdictions that consistently hand down astronomical awards, even
when the case has little or no connection to the State or locality.""

Critics of forum shopping charge manipulation, wrongdoing, and
abuse by lawyers (invariably plaintiffs' lawyers) to obtain a forum and
substantive law to which they are not entitled. Indeed, critics charge,
so egregious and abusive is this behavior that sanctions should be
mandated. 2 There is a real possibility that Congress may act on this
misguided concern and require sanctions for forum shopping and
legislatively restrict venue choices. Legislatively restricting venue
choices by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1391 would limit forum choices for
lawsuits filed in federal courts 3 but would not affect forum selection
for lawsuits filed in state courts. However, Congress is currently
considering a proposal that would federalize venue'4 by limiting
10. See, e.g., Mary P. Gallagher, Bill Ramping Up Rule 11 Sanctions Passed by House,
Pending in Senate, N.J. L.J., Oct. 11, 2004, at 1 (describing proposed amendments to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 as "intended to deter frivolous suits and forum
shopping"); Legal Reform, House Bill Would Rein in Frivolous Lawsuits, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 19, 2004, at G2, available at 2004 WLNR 16960428 (describing the
proposed Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act as "prevent[ing] so-called 'forum-shopping,' in
which attorneys seek out judges and courts known for handing out excessive damage
awards").
11. Blunt Votes to Curb Junk Lawsuits, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 14, 2004 (describing
the proposed Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act).
12. See Norwood, supra note 5, at 329-30 (noting that courts generally have not
imposed Rule 11 sanctions in forum shopping cases but suggesting that sanctions are
appropriate); id. at 326-28 (stating that restrictions on forum shopping "can be enforced
through Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule ll's state counterparts and
the forum's own ethics rules" (footnote omitted)).
13. For example, in diversity cases, § 1391 authorizes venue in
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is
the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant
is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is
no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2000).
14. A prime example of overreaction to forum shopping can be found in proposed
congressional "tort reform." After H.R. 4571, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004,
passed the House of Representatives but stalled in the Senate, the bill was reintroduced in
the House in the following session. See Congress Passes Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of
2004, 21 MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY, Oct. 2004, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Congress
Passes LARA] (reporting that the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004 passed the
House of Representatives); see also Rhonda McMillion, Standing Pat on Rule 11, A.B.A.
J., July 2005, at 62, 62 ("The [Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act] passed the House of
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forum options in both federal and state courts.15
Forum "shopping" suggests unfairness in choosing to litigate in a
particular forum due to differences in the law and fails to
acknowledge that the availability of different laws is neither wrong
Representatives during the 108th Congress (in 2003-04), but did not come to a vote in the
Senate. The bill was reintroduced in the House this year by Rep. Lamar S. Smith, RTexas."). The 2005 version of the bill, H.R. 420, the so-called Lawsuit Abuse Reduction
Act of 2005, was favorably reported out of the House Judiciary Committee and placed on
the Union Calendar for consideration by the full House of Representatives in June 2005;
in October 2005, the bill passed the House of Representatives and was referred to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. See H.R. 420, Bill Summary and Status for the 109th
Congress:
All Congressional
Actions, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d09:HR00420:@@@R (last visited Nov. 28, 2005); see also InsurerSupported 'Lawsuit Abuse Bill' Clears U.S. House Panel, BESTWIRE SERVICE, May 25,
2005, available at Westlaw 5/25/05 BESTWIRE SERVICE (reporting that "[bJy a 19-11
margin, the [U.S. House Judiciary Committee] favorably reported H.R. 420 for
consideration by the full House of Representatives"). Section 4 of the proposed Act,
entitled "Prevention of Forum-Shopping," provides in part:
(a) In General. Subject to subsection (b), a personal injury claim filed in State or
Federal court may be filed only in the State and, within that State, in the county
(or Federal district) in which...
(1) the person bringing the claim, including an estate in the case of a decedent and
a parent or guardian in the case of a minor or incompetent(A) resides at the time of filing; or
(B) resided at the time of the alleged injury; or
(2) the alleged injury or circumstances giving rise to the personal injury claim
allegedly occurred;
(3) the defendant's principal place of business is located, if the defendant is a
corporation; or
(4) the defendant resides, if the defendant is an individual.
(b) Determination of Most Appropriate Forum-If a person alleges that the injury
or circumstances giving rise to the personal injury claim occurred in more than one
county (or Federal district), the trial court shall determine which State and county
(or Federal district) is the most appropriate forum for the claim. If the court
determines that another forum would be the most appropriate forum for a claim,
the court shall dismiss the claim ....
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420. 109th Cong. § 4 (2005), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109-cong-bills&docid=f:h420
rh.txt.pdf.
15. See supra note 14 (setting forth the proposed Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of
2005, which purports to limit venue options for personal injury lawsuits "filed in State or
Federal court"). Another bill-the Class Action Fairness Act, which passed Congress and
was signed by President Bush in 2005-also carried implications for forum shopping, but
of a different sort. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1711-1715, 1332, 1453 (2005)); see also Melanie Warner, The
Food Industry Empire Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at CI (describing the Class
Action Fairness Act as "an initiative intended to prevent trial lawyers from shopping for
the most favorable states to bring their cases"). The Act modified the requirements for
diversity jurisdiction in certain class actions in which the matter in controversy exceeds $5
million, which will permit many class actions to be filed in-or removed to-the federal
courts. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d) (Supp. 12005) (setting forth the prerequisites).
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nor unusual. Both the Constitution itself and our federal system
permit, encourage, and expect states to create their own laws. Far
from being illegitimate, if the law authorizes the filing of a lawsuit in
more than one forum, the law has authorized choice-and indeed our
governmental structure tends to create choice, both between (or
among) states and between state courts and federal courts. 6 In
enacting laws, states often are conscious of the differences among
states' laws. The attractiveness of certain laws to litigants often is a
deliberate, intentional result, and thus congressional proposals to
federalize venue are tantamount to attacks on states' constitutionallygrounded lawmaking abilities. Indeed, forum shopping furthers state
interests.
Permissive theories of choice of law are the engine that drives
much contemporary forum-shopping. They often are based on
the notion that a state's broad application of its own law
furthers the goals of that law. Thus, encouraging forumshopping furthers assertion of state interests. It helps states
differ from one another. Choice of law is seen as closely bound
to substantive law. It can also be seen as an important
common-law field in and of itself .... The system should take a
hospitable view of the existence of a number of conflicts
theories, including those that engender forum-shopping.17

16. Diversity jurisdiction is a prominent example of such choice.
Diversity
jurisdiction provides, as an alternative choice, the option of filing, in a federal court, a case
for which state court jurisdiction already exists. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY
KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 151 (6th ed. 2002) ("Undoubtedly, so
long as diversity exists, the choice of forum will be utilized for tactical purposes .... ");
John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction,16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 405 (1979)
(noting that "diversity jurisdiction provides an option" for resolving disputes and stating,
"Diversity jurisdiction must be seen for what it is, a social service of the federal
government provided for the people of the United States."); id. at 410 (discussing the
benefits of "maintaining a concurrent system"); John P. Frank, An Idea Whose Time Is
Still Here, 70 A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 17, 18 ("So far as disputes between citizens of
different states are concerned, [diversity jurisdiction] gives a certain amount of option to
attorneys to choose where they want to dispose of disputes."); Earl M. Maltz, Choice of
Forum and Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: A Reconsiderationof Erie Principles,79
KY. L.J. 231, 236 (1991) ("By its nature, establishing diversity jurisdiction in the judicial
system will give some parties the power to choose between state courts and federal
courts."); Alvin B. Rubin, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, 70 A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 16,
16 (noting that "the federal system through diversity jurisdiction ... offer[s] forum
shopping as a service"); see also John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 693, 712 n.111 (1974) ("In general, the more one equalizes the ability to choose
the forum, the further one deviates from the rationale of the diversity jurisdiction.").
17. George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why Doesn't a
Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 665 (1993) (footnote
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The "unfairness" alleged in forum shopping is curious. After all,
no state's law authorizes recovery against a blameless defendant. In
every state, a favorable verdict for the plaintiff requires the plaintiff
to prove her case.
Accordingly, the complaints about forum
shopping's "unfairness" largely fall into three categories: (1) forum
shopping can result in a defendant, who has been proven
blameworthy, paying the injured plaintiff a higher amount because
the lawsuit was legitimately filed in a lawful forum authorizing higher
damages (when the wrongdoing defendant would rather have paid a
lower amount, which would have been the result had the lawsuit been
filed in a different lawful, legitimate forum); (2) forum shopping can
permit a plaintiff's lawsuit to proceed in one state having a longer
statute of limitations when the lawsuit would have been barred in
another state having a shorter statute of limitations (when the
wrongdoing defendant would have preferred to avoid compensating
the plaintiff at all by arguing that the plaintiff missed the deadline);
and (3) forum shopping pressures defendants to settle lawsuits filed in
forums viewed as sympathetic to plaintiffs, even when the specific
lawsuit at issue lacks foundation or merit (which suggests some
forums are so pro-plaintiff that plaintiffs obtain favorable verdicts
without requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant's liability).
This Article assumes that these complaints are valid in some
instances, although the existence of pro-plaintiff forums has been
exaggerated, 8 and with respect to the alleged pressure to settle
meritless cases, one additionally might question whether this reflects
a larger problem with settlements more generally rather than a
problem with the practice of forum shopping.19 However, current
omitted).
18. See Stephanie Mencimer, False Alarm: How the Media Helps the Insurance
Industry and the GOP Promote the Myth of America's "Lawsuit Crisis," WASH.
MONTHLY, Oct. 2004, at 18, 18 (discussing the prevalence of "fictional lawsuit horror

stories," including misleading stories regarding supposedly pro-plaintiff forums); see also
Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 731 (1998) (discussing the hyping of seemingly outrageous

cases that are sometimes entirely fictional and sometimes grossly exaggerated, and noting
that, "[i]t is a universe in which corporations and governments are [portrayed as] victims,
and individuals (and their lawyers) are [portrayed as] the aggressors"); Edith Greene, A
Love-Hate Relationship, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 99, 100 (1995) ("The plural of anecdote is not
data."). Indeed, some of the publicity concerning so-called pro-plaintiff forums comes
from the American Tort Reform Association, "which every year publishes a 'study'
purporting to identify various jurisdictions around the country it deems too plaintifffriendly and in need of reform." Mencimer, supra, at 18.
19. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)

(presenting arguments against the trend toward settlement of disputes); Rex R.
Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (discussing
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congressional proposals exhibit little more than hostility toward
plaintiffs-the notion that "I want someone else to win"-which
suggests that politics, rather than a genuine problem with forum
shopping itself, motivates these proposals." "Tort reform is not
simply a 'product' being marketed, it is also a set of political goals
that involve changing the civil justice system to favor particular
issues arising from encouraging-and pressuring-parties to settle); Judith Resnik,
Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences for
Settlement, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 155, 155 (discussing "the puzzles presented by the
contrast between judicial preferences for settlement and litigants' preferences for
process").
20. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact that It Has Had Is Between
People's Ears": Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
453, 453-54 (2000) ("Tort reform, it now seems, is a permanent fixture of the political
agenda ....

Tort reform's vision of civil litigation ...

is a vision full of evocative

metaphors and threatening images.").
[Tort reform] describes a system where, among other things, the number of
personal injury suits is significantly higher than in the past (the litigation
explosion); where more people bring lawsuits than should (frivolous lawsuits);
where the size of awards is increasing faster than inflation (skyrocketing awards);
where the size of most awards is excessive (outrageous awards); where the logic of
verdicts and awards is capricious (the lawsuit lottery); where the cost of lawsuits is
too high and the delays too great (a wasteful, inefficient system); where there is no
longer a fair balance between the injured person and the defendant (exploiting
"deep pockets"); and ultimately a system where the cost to society is unacceptably
high ("we all pay the price").
Id. at 454; see also id. (describing tort reform as "constructing this vision and persuading
the public of its veracity (and in turn persuading them of the need for change)").
At the core of this agenda-setting process ... is the identification of
"problems." Problems ... "[a]re not given, out there in the world waiting for
smart analysts to come along and define them correctly. They are created in the
minds of citizens by other citizens, leaders, organizations, and governmental
agencies, as an essential part of political maneuvering." As a result, the process of
gaining a place on the agenda is essentially "a struggle to control which images of
the world govern policy." This process has come to resemble the mass marketing
of products by commercial interests.
Id. at 460 (quoting DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 122,

309 (1988)).
In constructing its vision of civil litigation, tort reform does not, as a number of
commentators have shown, rely on systematic, empirical investigation of the civil
justice system and how that system works. The vision represents a triumph of
marketing over reality. ...

The reformers' purpose ... is not ... to construct a

reasonably accurate vision of reality .... They want to sell to the public, as well as
to key elites, a vision of civil litigation that would serve a set of political goals.
Id. at 461 (footnote omitted); see also Jay Yeager, Congress and Indiana Class Actions,
INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., Mar. 28, 2005, at 13A (stating that Congress, in passing the Class
Action Fairness Act, "assum[ed] that litigating in federal court will ... yield a better result
than litigating in state court").
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interests."2 1
In particular, corporations, small businesses, and
physicians seem to have co-opted the attention of Congress and the
media, asserting that out-of-control, frivolous lawsuits are unfairly
filed in pro-plaintiff forums and that resultant outrageous judgments
are forcing them out of business. 2 In light of the political component
within anti-forum shopping rhetoric, one must ask whether forum
shopping is genuinely so problematic-in terms of both the number of
cases implicated and the severity of the practice's effect-as to
warrant the drastic step of congressional intermeddling with the work
of state legislatures.
Faced with two or more courthouse choices, the lawyer must
make a selection.
The semantic distinction between forum
"selection" and forum "shopping" suggests a legitimate choice versus
an illegitimate one. But this distinction is impossible to maintain with
any consistency. Consider Black's Law Dictionary, which defines
"forum shopping" as a litigant's attempt "to have his action tried in a
particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most
favorable judgment or verdict."23 Implicit in this definition is the
recognition that, in deciding where to file a lawsuit, lawyers often
have more than one option,24 yet the definition also implies that
choices based on the potential for the most favorable outcome are
illegitimate.
The venomous rhetoric recently directed toward forum shopping
conveys a sense that forum shopping is "cheating"-unscrupulously
manipulating the choice of forum in order to gain an unfair result
(one to which the litigant is not entitled). It is the premise of this
21. Daniels & Martin, supra note 20, at 459.
22. See Congress Passes LARA, supra note 14 (quoting Rep. Randy Neugebauer, the
co-sponsor of the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004, as saying, "People trying to cash
in on the lawsuit lottery are causing doctors to stop practicing and forcing many small
businesses to eliminate jobs or even shut down."); see also Mencimer, supra note 18
(noting that "skewed [media] coverage" has benefited "corporate giants" by helping to
"fuel political support for curtailing Americans' right to hold corporations and individuals

accountable for negligence, fraud, and other malfeasance in court").
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 590 (5th ed. 1979); see also Norwood, supra note 5, at
268 (citing Black's Law Dictionary); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1677, 1677 (1990) (same). But see Brown, supra note 17, at 653 (footnote omitted)
(noting that "[t]he concept of 'forum-shopping' is exceedingly difficult to define because it

encompasses a broad range of actions by plaintiffs and defendants").
24. See ROBERT S. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION § 1:01, at 1-1 (2d
ed. 1999) ("The United States contains 52 different court systems. More than one court
system may be competent to adjudicate any given case."); see also id. § 6:01, at 6-1 ("Just
as parties seeking the most favorable forum may have a choice between courts in different
states, so parties may also have a choice within the same state between state and federal

courts.").
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Article that the hostility toward forum shopping is based on
numerous flawed underlying assumptions-flawed assumptions
regarding legitimate forums, flawed assumptions regarding law and
remedies, and flawed assumptions regarding justice. Moreover, the
widespread approbation associated with forum shopping would seem
to suggest that forum shopping comprises one specific illegitimate act
Forum shopping, however, actually
or course of conduct.
encompasses not one but five basic and overlapping types of
decisionmaking considerations-only one of which the Supreme
Court has condemned. "Type One" forum shopping involves the
choice between federal court and state court. "Type Two" forum
shopping involves the choice between a court in one state (whether a
state court or a federal court) and a court in another state. "Type
Three" forum shopping involves differences in substantive law
depending on where the lawsuit is filed. "Type Four" forum shopping
involves differences in procedural provisions depending on where the
lawsuit is filed. And "Type Five" forum shopping involves subjective
and personal factors, such as the convenience of the forum, where the
attorney is licensed to practice, or the reputations of the prospective
judges. A full analysis of forum shopping requires examining whether
any or all of these considerations contribute to the complaints leveled
at forum selection. Unless these considerations contribute to genuine
unfairness, rather than merely constituting a political preference for
defendants over plaintiffs, the condemnation of forum shopping is
misdirected and congressional remedies are either misguided or
outright harmful.
Moreover, even if there are legitimate objections directed to one
or more of these five types of forum shopping, the current outcry is
curiously one-sided. Current spin ascribes forum shopping as a
device employed by unsavory, greedy plaintiffs' lawyers.25
25. See Charles B. Camp, Advocates Hope To Pass the "Big Four" Tort Reforms,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 8, 1995, at 10H (referring to the "Big Four priority items"
in the Texas legislature as including "[m]easures to prevent forum-shopping by plaintiffs
....
Defendants jockey for favorable venues, too, but the proposed change would focus
on plaintiffs, forcing them to sue only in a corporate defendant's home county or where
the event occurred."); Jim Drinkard, Bush To Sign Bill on Class-Action Suits, USA
TODAY, Feb. 18, 2005, at IB, available at 2005 WLNR 2345720 (describing forum
shopping as "the quest by plaintiffs' lawyers to find the most friendly and generous*
jurisdictions in which to file their cases"); Arthur D. Postal, Senate Puts Class-Action
Reform on Fast Track, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CAS., Jan. 31, 2005, at 10 (quoting
executive with the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies as stating, with
respect to the Class Action Fairness Act, "This bill will go a long way toward discouraging
forum shopping by the plaintiffs' bar."). See generally H.R. REP. 109-123, at 3 (2005),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109-cong-reports
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Conveniently overlooked is the broad range of forum shopping tactics
available to-and regularly employed by-defense attorneys,

including such tactics as removal, transfer of venue, and forum non
conveniens.26 Accordingly, "forum shopping" begins to sound simply
like a pejorative label.27
Multiple options implicate choice-and choice involves
evaluation. Moreover, a lawyer who does not thoroughly and
conscientiously evaluate all available options does so at her
professional peril. The ethical rules require lawyers to represent
clients to the best of their ability, 28 and selecting the forum most
favorable to the client's claim is an integral part of vigorous and
effective representation.2 9 Indeed, the failure to forum shop would, in

most instances, constitute malpractice.3"
Law and economics' rational choice theory and game theory also

&docid=f:hr123.109.pdf (stating that the Act would "prevent forum shopping, the
nefarious practice by which personal injury attorneys bring lawsuits in courts that
notoriously and consistently hand down astronomical awards even when the case has little
or no connection to the court's jurisdiction").
26. See Brown, supra note 17, at 653 ("The plaintiff makes the initial forum choice,
but the defendant may be able to trump it through such devices as removal from state to
federal court, transfer from one federal court to another, or dismissal from a state court on
forum non conveniens grounds." (footnotes omitted)).
[D]efendants too can engage in forum shopping. Removal of a case from state to
federal court is an obvious example. Defendants can also challenge personal
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or venue, and can seek dismissal on forum
non conveniens grounds .... Juror challenges, moreover, are open to defendants
as well as plaintiffs. Even the choice not to challenge may be forum shopping-for
example, a defendant may accept jurisdiction where constitutionally sufficient
minimum contacts do not exist, hoping for a more favorable final adjudication of a
claim or issue. Another option is to turn the tables and become a plaintiff by suing
for a declaratory judgment. Finally, parties can contract through forum selection
clauses to create jurisdiction in a particular forum.
Note, supra note 23, at 1679-80.
27. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,63 TUL. L.
REV. 553, 571 (1989) (noting that forum shopping "is only a pejorative way of saying that,
if you offer a plaintiff a choice of jurisdictions, he will naturally choose the one in which he
thinks his case can be most favourably presented: this should be a matter neither for
surprise nor for indignation" (quotation omitted)); see also Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831
F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987) ("There is nothing inherently evil about forumshopping.").
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2004) ("A lawyer must
... act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf."); see also infra note 156 and authorities cited therein.
29. See Juenger, supra note 27, at 572 (noting that "attorneys owe a duty to vindicate
their clients' rights wherever they can expect the best results").
30. See id. (noting that "[w]hen a relationship becomes litigious, failure to select an
advantageous forum may amount to malpractice" (footnote omitted)).

THE FORUM GAME

2006]

345

support the evaluation of forum options. Contrary to the mediafueled clamor suggesting that forum shopping involves illicit choices
and irrational results, when the law authorizes more than one
legitimate forum, and when one of those lawfully authorized forums
implicates the potential for a more favorable outcome, both rational
choice theory and game theory support the rationality of selecting
that more favorable forum. Accordingly, rather than permitting
politics to distort the lens through which we view forum shopping, it
becomes important to evaluate forum shopping with a clearer eye.
This Article examines the forum game from historical, ethical,
and economic perspectives. Part I examines a taxonomy of forum
shopping.3 Part II analyzes the law of forum shopping-both the law
generally, which often authorizes a choice between two or more
legitimate forums and the law in terms of the Supreme Court's forum
shopping jurisprudence. This Part reveals inconsistencies in the
Supreme Court's view of the practice: the Supreme Court has
condemned forum shopping only in a very limited, very narrow
context and has otherwise repeatedly endorsed forum shopping's
validity.32 Part III analyzes the ethical rules and the ethical demands
of vigorous representation, concluding that forum shopping is an
essential component of zealous representation, and that courts may
not sanction attorneys whose sole "offense" is seeking a favorable
forum.33 Part IV analyzes forum shopping under law and economics'
rational choice and game theories of decisionmaking, which illustrate
the rationality of forum shopping.3 4 Part V examines the myths
underlying the vocal antipathy toward forum shopping, despite the
Finally, Part
legitimacy of the practice under most circumstances.
VI argues that Congress is also attempting to play the forum game
through proposals to federalize venue that would shift the existing
litigation balances-proposals that would infringe upon legitimate
lawmaking choices exercised by the states.3 6
I. A TAXONOMY OF FORUM SHOPPING

Forum shopping is not one act or course of conduct but instead
encompasses a variety of factors and choices. This Part describes the
five basic, and overlapping, types of decisionmaking considerations
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

37-53 and accompanying text.
54-149 and accompanying text.
150-63 and accompanying text.
164-205 and accompanying text.
206-33 and accompanying text.
234-41 and accompanying text.
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inherent in forum selection: (1) choices involving federal courts
versus state courts; (2) choices involving courts in different states; (3)
choices involving different substantive laws; (4) choices involving
different procedural provisions; and (5) choices involving subjective
and personal factors.
Forum selection necessarily involves choice; if only one forum is
an option, no forum "selection" process ever comes into play.
However, the structure of our judicial system tends to create more
than one authorized forum and gives the initial choice to the plaintiff.
The American system ... envisions a set of fora in which it
would be fair for the defendant to be forced to litigate. The
plaintiff has the power to choose any forum within that set as
the venue for the lawsuit. If the plaintiff chooses a court that is
not within the set of fair fora, the defendant has the right to
veto the plaintiff's choice, but the defendant generally does not
have the right to designate the specific court that will hear the
lawsuit. The key question is not whether the plaintiff has
chosen the forum that would be most appropriate to hear the
lawsuit; instead, the only issue is whether the court selected by
the plaintiff is included in the set of fair fora.37
The first two choices discussed in this Part involve the forum
type and the forum location. The three remaining choices are an
overlay-the considerations that inform and guide decisions between
and among forum type and location.
A.

"Type One" Forum Shopping: Choices Involving Federal Courts
Versus State Courts

In selecting a forum, one consideration in the decisionmaking
process is whether a choice is available that allows filing the lawsuit in
either a federal court or a state court. Some types of cases, of course,
are restricted solely to state courts or solely to federal courts, such as
37. Maltz, supra note 16, at 249 (footnote omitted).

The strongest justification for forum shopping is the plaintiff's-choice principle.
After all, inherent in the principle that the plaintiff can choose the place of suit is
that the plaintiff may shop for a favorable forum. The plaintiff's privilege of
forum selection is meaningful only if the plaintiff can choose a court that he
believes will be more favorable to his interests than the more logical or convenient

court. Forum shopping is made possible by the fact that the law provides a range
of permissible venues, instead of establishing rules that would lead to a single
proper place of suit.
Antony L. Ryan, Principlesof Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167,202 (2000).
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divorce actions, which must be filed in state courts, 38 or patent
litigation, which must be filed in federal courts.39 If the nature of the
lawsuit does not limit filing to a state court (or to a federal court), a
choice may exist between federal court and state court due to the
concurrent jurisdiction of these courts over most types of claims.4 0 To
make use of that concurrent jurisdiction in a particular case, the
litigant must satisfy the prerequisites for subject matter jurisdiction,
personal jurisdiction, and venue 4 1-but assuming that she is able to do
so, the choice between a federal versus a state forum becomes a
consideration. In evaluating this consideration for forum selection
purposes, unless the attorney harbors an unusual conviction that a
federal court is always superior to a state court (or vice-versa), the
decisionmaking process typically will overlap with one or more of the
additional considerations set forth in Parts I.B through I.E below.
B.

"Type Two" Forum Shopping: Choices Involving Courts in
Different States

In addition to choices between federal courts and state courts,
another consideration in the forum selection process is whether more
than one state provides a potential forum. In some cases, a litigant
may be able to satisfy subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and venue prerequisites in more than one state, thereby

38. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL

ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE

§ 2.5, at 26 (1999).

[T]here are two areas of substantive law in which the federal courts traditionally
have refused to exercise jurisdiction, despite the existence of all the necessary
ingredients for diversity. These are domestic relations and probate cases. In the
field of domestic relations, the established rule is that federal courts will not
adjudicate cases involving marital status. A federal court will not grant a divorce,
make an award of alimony, or settle a controversy over the custody of a child. The
rationale for this limitation is that family relations are uniquely a matter of state
policy and state interest, with which the federal courts should not interfere.
Id.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... Such
jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent ...cases."). Other
examples of exclusive federal court jurisdiction include federal crimes and bankruptcy.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2000) ("The district courts of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the
United States."); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a), amended by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (Supp. I 2005)
("[T]he district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title
11.").
40. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing concurrent jurisdiction).
41. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue prerequisites).
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providing a choice between (or among) courts in different states.42
Subject to subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue
limitations, the litigant may have choices between state courts in
different states, between federal courts in different states, or between
(or among) a patchwork of options involving both federal and state
courts. This latter option-choices between federal courts and state
courts-was discussed in Part I.A above, and the decisionmaking

process for any of these court choices will tend to involve the
additional considerations set forth in Parts I.C through I.E below.
C.

"Type Three" Forum Shopping: Choices Involving Different
Substantive Laws

In some cases, the availability of more than one forum will be
accompanied by differences in the substantive law that will govern the
litigation, depending on which forum is selected. 3 Thus, sometimes

when a choice is available involving courts in different states, the
choice between (or among) states also implicates a choice in the
governing substantive law. A choice of courts in different states will
not always afford a choice in substantive law, of course, but will
depend on whether differences exist in the provisions of the states'
applicable laws, as well as the choice-of-law principles followed by

those states.44
42. See CASAD, supra note 24, § 6:01, at 6-1 (noting that parties "may have a choice
between courts in different states"); see also Juenger, supra note 27, at 559-60 (noting that
"intrastate forum shopping between state and federal courts continues unabated").
43. See Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum
Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1390 (2004)
("The choice of forum may give the party some control over.., substantive law."); Ryan,
supra note 37, at 191 ("One of the most important potential consequences of forum
selection is a difference in applicable law .... [T]he substantive law applied to a given
dispute often depends on the place of suit.").
44. See Juenger, supra note 27, at 558-59 ("Choice-of-law doctrines present yet
another incentive to the forum shopper .... If the decision of a lawsuit depends upon
where it is brought, plaintiffs are tempted to file in states whose law is favorable to their
causes."); see also Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and EmpiricalAnalysis of Choice of
Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 49 (1989) (discussing states' approaches to choice of law). Choice
of law "means a court's determination of which law to apply in private law litigation with
multistate elements." Id. at 49 n.1. Accordingly, "[t]he plaintiff's shopping will consist
generally of a twofold search for a jurisdiction with a favorable substantive law and a
choice of law theory that will point to the application of that law." Brown, supra note 17,
at 674. "[Tjhere is a strong tendency under all modern conflicts systems to apply forum
law."
Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping,
International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 559, 560 (2002). Professor
Brilmayer has charged that choice of law approaches are typically "pro-resident, proforum-law, and pro-recovery."
Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of
Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392, 398 (1980); see also Brown, supra note 17, at 720
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A choice of forums invoking different substantive laws is perhaps
the classic forum shopping paradigm, and the one most likely to stir
incendiary debate. 4 Differences in substantive law raise the spectre
of differences in ultimate outcome based on the lawyer's choice of
forum. When forum shopping has the possibility of netting a more
favorable outcome, some observers castigate such forum shopping as
unfair, devious, and impermissible. However, choices involving
different substantive laws do not raise uniform concerns and are not
uniformly impermissible. Under the principles set forth in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 46 and subsequent cases, concerns regarding
the potential for applying different substantive law as between a
federal court and a state court located within the same state led the
Supreme Court to require federal courts in diversity cases to apply
the substantive law of the state in which they sit. As explained more
thoroughly in Part II below, however, the Supreme Court has only
condemned forum shopping in the narrow context presented by the
Erie case-in order to prevent different results from inuring within
the same state due to the application of different substantive law as
between a state court and a federal court located within that state.47
The Supreme Court has never prohibited choices involving different
substantive laws beyond the narrow Erie context, and therefore
differences in the substantive law remain one of the considerations in
forum selection.
D. "Type Four" Forum Shopping: Choices Involving Different
ProceduralProvisions
A choice of forums implicating different procedural provisions
also impacts the forum selection process.46 Procedure is a powerful
("State court choice of law practices often favor forum-shopping.").
45. The late Professor Juenger argued, however, that "forum shopping is prompted, in
large measure, by reasons other than the diversity of substantive and choice-of-law rules,"

including familiarity, procedural advantages, forum reputation, and the pace of judicial
proceedings. Juenger, supra note 27, at 573-74.
46. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
47. See infra note 101 and accompanying text (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945), which sought substantially the same outcome in diversity cases

regardless of whether the case is tried in federal or state court); see also Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) (holding that Congress has the power to prescribe procedural
rules that differ from state law rules, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even at
the expense of altering the outcome of litigation, and observing that Erie "involved no
Federal Rule and dealt with a question which was 'substantive' in every traditional sense

(whether the railroad owed a duty of care to Tompkins as a trespasser or a licensee)").
48. See Ghei & Parisi, supra note 43, at 1390 (noting that "[t]he choice of forum may
give the party some control over ... procedural ... law"); see also Ryan, supra note 37, at
200 ("The choice of favorable substantive law is the most dramatic prize for the successful

350

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

tool, as noted in the oft-quoted line, "I'll let you write the substance
... and you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw you every

time.

'49

Procedural provisions may include such differences in

statutes, rules, or local rules; civil procedure or evidence provisions;
and under some circumstances, federal provisions versus state

provisions. A difference in procedural provisions may lead to a
difference in the ultimate outcome of the case 50 or may merely
constitute a relevant decisionmaking consideration due to the

lawyer's greater familiarity with a particular set of procedural
provisions.
E.

"Type Five" Forum Shopping: Choices Involving Subjective and
PersonalFactors

The fifth and last consideration in forum selection encompasses
subjective and personal factors. This wide-reaching category is a
form of catch-all for the numerous remaining considerations that
lawyers factor into their forum selection decisions. Examples of these
subjective and personal factors include the jurisdictions in which the
lawyer is licensed to practice; the reputations of (or prior experience

before) the prospective judges; perceptions of the prospective jury
pool as pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant; prior judicial decisions issued
by the available forums; previous jury awards in the available forums;
and convenience factors (both in terms of convenience to parties and
witnesses and in terms of personal convenience to the lawyer).5'
forum-shopper, but there are also many important procedural distinctions among
courts.").
49. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearingson H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312
(1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
50. See Kimberly A. Moore & Francesco Parisi, Rethinking Forum Shopping in
Cyberspace, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1325, 1331 (2002) (noting that "the outcome of the
case can be independently influenced by... procedural variations").
51. See Friedrich K. Juenger, What's Wrong with Forum Shopping?, 16 SYDNEY L.
REV. 5, 9-10 (1994) (discussing American practice and stating that "[tjhe plaintiff usually
shops in the forum with which he is most familiar or in which he gains the greatest
procedural advantage or puts the defendant to the greatest procedural disadvantage"
(citing L. Collins, Contractual Obligations: The EEC Preliminary Draft Convention on
Private InternationalLaw, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35, 36 (1976)); see also CASAD, supra
note 24, §§ 2:01-2:28 (discussing practical and tactical considerations in selecting a forum).
Professor Algero has catalogued the reasons for forum shopping as follows:
An attorney who is forum shopping might take into account any one or more of
the following factors: the reputation of the judges in a particular trial court and
the corresponding appellate court; an evaluation of the reputation and
characteristics of potential jurors who would make up the jury venire; potential
success by counsel for both parties in the jurisdiction, including perceived
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Some of these factors merely concern familiarity or convenience.
However, to the extent that these factors include prior jury awards
and perceptions of the jury pool, they implicate the spectre of an
outcome-altering choice-the type of choice criticized by the media
and congressional proposals.12 "Spectre," of course, is a particularly
appropriate word in light of the numerous studies finding that charges
of pro-plaintiff bias by juries are largely unsubstantiated."
advantages attorneys might have in that jurisdiction because of political
connections, friendships, family name, past success, or current reputation; the
political climate and bias in a particular jurisdiction; the characteristics and
reputation of one's own client in light of the above; traditional factors of
convenience, including convenience of witnesses, parties, and attorneys;
procedural rules existing in the venue; and the law likely to be applied in a
particular jurisdiction.
Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a
Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 80 n.2 (1999); see also Juenger, supra note 27, at 573-74
(noting that an "informed [forum] choice" includes considerations of "the forum's
reputation for fairness (or pro-plaintiff bias), the efficacy and speed of judicial
proceedings, the quality of available counsel, and.., the 'legal climate' ").
52. See supra notes 18, 22 and accompanying text (discussing exaggerations regarding
purportedly pro-plaintiff forums).
53. See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 216 (2000) ("The ... claim, that juries are pro-plaintiff,
cannot be supported. The studies that have contrasted judicial views and civil jury verdicts
find substantial overlap between judge and jury, and when their decisions diverge, juries
are no more likely to favor the plaintiff in civil litigation, including litigation with business
defendants."); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1125-26, 1133-34 (1992) (analyzing
a study covering fiscal years 1979-1989 for all ninety-four federal districts, using data
gathered by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, comparing plaintiff
win rates and recoveries in civil cases tried before juries and judges, and concluding that,
contrary to popular belief, in two of the most controversial areas of tort law-product
liability and medical malpractice-plaintiffs "prevail at trial at a much higher rate before
judges than they do before juries"); Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil
Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 61, 70 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)
("The literature, on the whole, converges on the judgment that juries are fine
decisionmakers. They are conscientious, collectively they understand and recall the
evidence as well as judges, and they decide on the basis of the evidence presented."
(footnotes omitted)); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic
Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals,
78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 883-84 (1993) (reporting "a controlled experiment involving a
medical negligence case, comparing juror awards with those rendered by experienced legal
professionals," and concluding that the damages awarded "for pain and suffering and
disfigurement and the rationales behind the awards did not differ between the two sets of
decisionmakers"); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An
Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 849, 898 (1998) (summarizing studies of civil
juries and concluding that "[r]esearch findings bearing on the performance of civil juries
yield little support for the extreme claims charging juries with poor and irresponsible
performance").
If the anecdotes accurately reflected jury verdicts, one would expect to find the
vast majority of jury verdicts favoring plaintiffs. But this is not the reality. The most
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All five of these decisionmaking considerations are inherent in
forum selection, and the potential exists for some, or even all, of these
considerations to overlap, depending on the specific case.
Accordingly, forum shopping is, at its core, merely the decision that a
lawyer makes when more than one lawful forum is available-yet
forum shopping carries an unusually strong negative connotation.
The next Part analyzes the law of forum shopping, finding that the
law regularly creates and authorizes a choice between two or more
forums, and that the Supreme Court has criticized only one very
limited type of forum shopping.
II. THE LAW OF FORUM SHOPPING
If forum shopping were indeed a devious, illegitimate, and unfair
practice, one would expect the law to circumscribe the available
forum options and would expect the Supreme Court to criticize the
forum shopping practice. But this is not the case. The law regularly
authorizes a choice between two or more legitimate forums, and the
Supreme Court generally has recognized the validity of forum
shopping, criticizing the practice only in one very narrow context.
A.

The Law Regularly Authorizes a Choice Between Two (or More)
Legitimate Forums

Given a client with a legally cognizable claim, once a decision is
made to pursue litigation, an attorney faces an initial decision
regarding where to file the lawsuit. Typically, choices are available.
Should she file in federal court or in state court? Should she file in
New York or in Pennsylvania? Should she file in the Northern
District of New York, the Eastern District of New York, the Western
District of New York, or the Southern District of New York?
Preliminary considerations of subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, and venue guide the inquiry, but any court in which these
three prerequisites can be satisfied becomes one of the choices
available.54
recent study compiled by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice concluded that across all
cases, plaintiffs won only "slightly more than 55 percent of all verdicts," and they won
"least often in medical malpractice and product liability cases, winning only 33 percent of
the former and 44 percent of the latter." ERIK MOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY
VERDICTS SINCE 1985, at xv, 39 (1996) (reporting a study based on jury verdicts from 1985
to 1994 in fifteen jurisdictions across the country). "Perhaps the most striking finding that
emerges from the jury verdict data in this study is that punitive damages are awarded very
rarely." Id. at 33. The study noted that punitive damages were awarded in only 2.6% of
all product liability verdicts. Id. at 36.
54. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (discussing subject matter
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Subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction implicitlyand venue explicitly-contemplate forum shopping. In the subject
matter jurisdiction arena, there is concurrent state jurisdiction over
most federal claims, thus creating a legitimate choice between a state
court and a federal court in most cases.55 In addition, diversity
jurisdiction provides the opportunity to file a state-law claim in
federal court at the plaintiff's option-or at the defendant's option
through removal-when the amount in controversy and diversity of
citizenship prerequisites can be satisfied. 6 Personal jurisdiction is not
limited to a single. forum,5 7 but is instead assessed on the basis of
satisfying the state's long-arm statute5 8 and constitutional minimum
contacts5 9 (or, in the case of "tag jurisdiction," actual physical

jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue).
55. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 38, § 2.2, at 13 ("By and large, federal court
subject matter jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the courts of the various states."); see
also CASAD, supra note 24, § 6:01, at 6-1 (noting that parties may have "a choice within the
same state between state and federal courts"). Another subject matter jurisdiction
example is the established rule that one's citizenship for diversity purposes is determined
as of the filing of the complaint, rather than the accrual of the cause of action, thereby
permitting a post-accrual change of citizenship so long as the relocation is bona fide. See
Baker v. Keck, 13 F. Supp. 486, 487 (E.D. Ill. 1936).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000); see also supra note 16 (discussing diversity jurisdiction
as providing an option between state court and federal court).
57. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 54
(1990) ("International Shoe has been widely heralded as the great 'liberator' of personal
jurisdiction from the formalisms of Pennoyer, and it is undoubtedly true that International
Shoe ushered in an era of expanded jurisdictional reach for state courts." (footnote
omitted)); Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum
Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
769, 834 (1995) (noting that the Supreme Court "has eschewed the opportunity to create
definitive rules," thus "mandat[ing] case-by-case, fact-specific inquiry"); id. at 836 (noting
that "the core of jurisdiction doctrine is unsettled"); Rex R. Perschbacher, Minimum
Contacts Reapplied: Mr. Justice Brennan Has It His Way in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585, 629 ("[S]ince International Shoe, the due process
limits on personal jurisdiction have been stated as broad principles using vague terms that
are difficult to apply in specific cases.").
58. See CASAD, supra note 24, app. B (setting forth the state long-arm statutes).
59. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[D]ue process
requires ... that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "). Indeed, International Shoe's expansion of personal jurisdiction is often
credited (or blamed) as a significant contributing factor to forum shopping. See, e.g.,
Brown, supra note 17, at 700 ("After all, forum-shopping cannot occur unless the
defendant can be sued in the forum, and the post-InternationalShoe developments in
constitutional standards are often cited as a factor in the growth of forum-shopping."
(footnote omitted)); Juenger, supra note 27, at 557-58 (crediting International Shoe's
expansion of personal jurisdiction with increasing forum choices).
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presence in the forum6"). Similarly, venue does not provide a single
option, but instead lists a number of choices, any of which is
appropriate. 6' Moreover, in federal courts, even when venue is
proper, § 1404 authorizes transfer of the lawsuit to "any other district
or division where it might have been brought" when such a transfer is
"[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest
of justice. ' 62 These principles and provisions indicate that choices
typically are available in deciding where to file a lawsuit. In some
instances, the choice may be simply between federal courts and state
courts within the same jurisdiction. In other instances, however,
there may be a broader range of options, encompassing more than
one state and encompassing both federal and state courts.
In addition to considerations of subject matter jurisdiction,
personal jurisdiction, and venue, choice of law principles play a role
in forum selection. In brief, choice of law principles vary by state,63
with some states following the old lex loci approach and others
following what is often called the "modern" or "new conflicts"
approach. The lex loci theory, found in the First Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, takes the approach that lawsuits are governed by
the substantive law of the jurisdiction where the tort or injury
occurred, or more generally, where the dispute arose.' As a result of
criticisms of the lex loci theory,6 5 other "modern" approaches

60. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (upholding personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident who was personally served with process while briefly in the
forum state).
61. See supra note 13 (setting forth the venue options under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)); see
also Ryan, supra note 37, at 170 ("One reason the plaintiff has a choice of forum is that
venue statutes afford him that choice. Rather than define the proper venue with
specificity, venue statutes typically let the plaintiff choose among a number of courtsalbeit a limited number-in which venue is proper."); id. at 172 (noting that "the more the
venue statute is liberalized, the more significant, too, becomes the plaintiff's venue
privilege"). See generally Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 2005)
("[T]he civil venue statute permits venue in multiple judicial districts ....
");id. (noting
that Congress amended the federal civil venue statute in 1990 to "lay[] venue in 'a'-not
'the'-judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred' [and thus tihe new language contemplates that venue can be
appropriate in more than one district").
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
63. See Juenger, supra note 27, at 559 (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), "obliges federal
judges to follow the forum-biased choice-of-law approach adopted by state courts").
64. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) (discussing

choice of law in tort actions).
65. See, e.g., WALTER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT

OF LAWS 71-89 (1949) (discussing and criticizing the First Restatement's approach);
Solimine, supra note 44, at 51-52 (discussing criticisms of the lex loci approach).
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developed which tend to use a more policy-oriented approachincluding Professor Currie's theory of interest analysis, which
concludes that in cases involving a "true" conflict the courts are illequipped to balance the interests of several states and therefore
should apply the forum's law,66 as well as the approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which attempts to
incorporate the relevant policies of the interested states along with
the older territorial notion.67
The result is a cornucopia of opportunities for forum-shopping
in any case in which there is more than one state with an
interest in the matter that might justify application of its law.
The plaintiff's shopping will consist generally of a twofold
search for a jurisdiction with a favorable substantive law and a
choice of law theory that will point to the application of that
law. Any of the modern methodologies would facilitate this
endeavor,
including
the
seemingly
neutral
Second
68
Restatement.
When more than one option is available, the multiple options
implicate choice 6 9 -and choice involves an evaluation of the available
options for potential benefits. The next step is to examine whether
the Supreme Court's decisions criticize forum shopping or provide a
legal basis for limiting the practice.
B.

The Supreme Court Goes Forum Shopping-And Enjoys the
Choices Available

If forum shopping were indeed as inherently unfair as the current
outcry would suggest, one might expect that the Supreme Court
would rein in the practice-either by suggesting the necessity for
legislative reforms, or by taking affirmative steps of its own, as the
Court has done in the area of punitive damages.7" But the Supreme
66. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-84
(1963) (discussing true conflicts and use of forum law); see also LEA BRILMAYER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 229-43 (1986)
(summarizing and critiquing Professor Currie's approach).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (discussing
policy considerations); id. §§ 145-146 (discussing choice of law in tort actions).
68. Brown, supra note 17, at 674.
69. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 2 (Cass
R. Sunstein ed., 2000) ("[T]he legal system is pervasively in the business of constructing
procedures, descriptions, and contexts for choice.").
70. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (holding
that a $145 million punitive damages award violated due process where the underlying
compensatory judgment was $1 million); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-
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Court has taken no such steps. Unlike the negative undercurrent in
recent news stories and proposed congressional action, the Supreme
Court has recognized that both plaintiffs and defendants engage in
forum shopping.7' Far from consistently condemning strategic forum
selection, the Court has criticized only federal versus state court
forum shopping7 2 (despite sometimes adopting rules that encourage
the practice7 3), and has repeatedly acknowledged the validity of stateto-state forum shopping.74
1. The Supreme Court's Very Narrow Prohibition Against a Very
Limited Type of Forum Shopping
The Supreme Court weighed in on the forum game to outlaw one
particular move. The Court's foray into this area began with a case in
which the plaintiff openly sought a more favorable outcome due to
differences in the substantive law as between federal court and state
court--differences that the Supreme Court itself had authorized.
Harry Tompkins and his lawyers went forum shopping; defendant
Erie Railroad made its move; and the Supreme Court, to everyone's
surprise, declared that it had misread the rules in its prior decisionand changed forever one part of the federal-state forum game.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins75 involved alleged negligence by
the Erie Railroad Company, resulting in injury and permanent
disability to Harry Tompkins. Tompkins was walking home late at
night on a footpath running parallel to the railroad tracks when he
86 (1996) (refusing to uphold $2 million punitive damages award accompanying a $4,000
compensatory damages award); Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines": The Due Process
Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 903 (2004)
(noting that "[t]he impetus for the Court's intervention [into the area of proportionality
and punitive damages] was the perception that punitive damages had 'run wild' ").
71. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 528 (1990) (plaintiffs); Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 626-36 (1964) (defendants).
72. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938) (overruling Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), because Swift "made rights enjoyed under the unwritten
'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
federal court").
73. See Ferens,494 U.S. at 528, 531 (acknowledging that the Court's holding might, in
effect, reward forum shopping, but concluding that there was no preferable alternative).
74. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984)
(characterizing, without criticism, state-to-state forum shopping as a typical litigation
strategy).
75. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The story of the accident underlying the Erie litigation and the
legal tactical strategies involved in litigating the case are compellingly told in the classic
article by Irving Younger. See Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV.
1011 (1978); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers,
Judges, Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004).
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was "struck by something which looked like a door projecting from
one of the moving cars. '7 6 Tompkins was a Pennsylvania citizen, and
the accident occurred in Pennsylvania.77 However, Pennsylvania law
would have precluded any recovery.
[U]nder the law of Pennsylvania, as declared by its highest
court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of
way-that is a longitudinal pathway as distinguished from a
crossing-are to be deemed trespassers; and ...the railroad is
not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from
its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful.7"
To avoid this unfavorable Pennsylvania law, Tompkins's lawyer
filed the lawsuit in federal court in the Southern District of New
York.7 9 Erie Railroad was incorporated in New York, thus creating
federal subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity." Filing in
New York permitted the federal court, under principles previously
announced in Swift v. Tyson,"1 to determine the railroad's duty
without regard to state case law; only state statutory law was
considered binding on the federal courts.8 2 Although the same
opportunity theoretically was available by filing in federal court in
Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit had established a practice of deferring
to the applicable state's case law. 3 The Second Circuit, governing
New York, had not adopted such a deferential practice. Therefore,
New York's federal courts appeared to afford the only possibility for
a fresh look at the railroad's duty without the constraints of
Pennsylvania case law.'

76. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 70.
79. Id. at 69.
80. Id.
81. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
82. See id. at 18 ("In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the
decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are;
and are not of themselves laws ....The laws of a state are more usually understood to
");see
mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof ....
also Erie, 304 U.S. at 71 (noting that Swift v. Tyson "held that federal courts exercising
jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship need not, in matters of general
jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the state as declared by its highest court; that
they are free to exercise an independent judgment as to what the common law of the State
is-or should be").
83. See Younger, supra note 75, at 1016.
84. See id. An additional important benefit to filing in New York was that
Tompkins's lawyers were licensed to practice in New York but not in Pennsylvania. See
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The strategy was successful; the New York federal court refused
to apply Pennsylvania state case law to preclude recovery and the jury
awarded Tompkins $30,000.85 The circuit court upheld the verdict,86
but the Supreme Court took the opportunity to overrule Swift v.
Tyson.8 7 The Supreme Court justified its conclusion using several
factors: (1) the historical inaccuracy underpinning Swift; (2) the
"mischievous results" of Swift's application; and (3) federalism
88
concerns.
The Court first observed that a scholar's research had
undermined Swift's construction of the Rules of Decision Act.89
Moreover, not only was Swift based on erroneous history, but the
application of federal "general law" led to differences in diversity
cases as to the law applied, depending on "whether enforcement was
sought in the state or in the federal court" 9 -a standard forum
shopping complaint. Authorizing the use of federal "general law" in
diversity cases would create the potential for a different outcome
depending on whether the suit was filed in federal or state courtprecisely the type of forum shopping that occurred in Erie.91
85. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 69 (framing the question presented as "whether the oft-challenged
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be disapproved").
88. Id. at 72-73, 74-75, 78-80.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
[Ilt was the more recent research of a competent scholar, who examined the
original document, which established that the construction given to [the Rules of
Decision Act] by the [Swift v. Tyson] Court was erroneous; and that the purpose of
the section was merely to make certain that, in all matters except those in which
some federal law is controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in
diversity of citizenship cases would apply as their rules of decision the law of the
State, unwritten as well as written.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
JudiciaryAct of 1789,37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51-52,81-88, 108 (1923)).
90. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75. The Supreme Court observed that in this manner, "Swift
v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens." Id. at 74; see
also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965) (noting that one of the underlying
issues in the application of state law in diversity cases is "whether application of the [state]
rule would make so important a difference to the character or result of the litigation that
failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State").
91. This same problem had occurred in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), decided a decade before
Erie. In Taxicab, both companies had originally been Kentucky corporations. See id. at
523-24. One had an exclusive contract with a railroad company, and sued to enjoin the
other from operating taxis at the railroad station. Id. at 522-23. Under Kentucky state
law, such exclusive dealing contracts were deemed to violate public policy and therefore
were unenforceable. Id. at 526. The plaintiff, prior to filing suit, dissolved the corporation
in Kentucky and reincorporated in Tennessee, then filed the lawsuit in federal court in
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Most importantly, however, the Court had decided that its
92
previous decision in Swift v. Tyson had been unconstitutional.
Although some commentators have criticized Erie as ambiguous,
confusing, and potentially invoking doctrines of federalism,
separation of powers, equal protection, and due process,9 3 any
"ambiguity" seems overstated.
Erie plainly and repeatedly expressed concern that Swift v. Tyson
had unconstitutionally authorized federal court intermeddling with
state law, and thereby with states' constitutionally-protected rights.
"[I]n applying the [Swift v. Tyson] doctrine this Court and the lower
courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the
Constitution to the several States."94 Other references to federalism
concerns abound.95 Accordingly, federalism would appear to be at
Kentucky to create diversity jurisdiction and thereby permit the application of federal
"general law" rather than the unfavorable Kentucky state law. Id. at 523-24. Consistent
with Swift v. Tyson, the Supreme Court affirmed the determination that the federal court
need not follow Kentucky law. Id. at 530. Setting the stage for the future Erie decision,
however, Justice Holmes, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, dissented, calling the
Taxicab decision an "unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of the United
States." Id. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis, one of the Taxicab
dissenters, was, of course, the author of the subsequent majority opinion in Erie. See Erie,
304 U.S. at 69.
92. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78 ("If only a question of statutory construction were
involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout
nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made
clear and compels us to do so.").
93. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 17, at 657 (discussing the ambiguous grounds of the
Erie decision); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 927 (1986) (noting that "Erie is ambiguous as to whether courts can
make rules as broadly as Congress"); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 29-46 (1991) (arguing that federal courts have created

federal common law in spite of the rule of Erie).
Erie's ambiguities are several and obvious. If the decision rests on statutory
grounds, the constitutional portion may be unnecessary dictum. Even if it is
constitutionally based, the Court confused the matter by failing to cite directly any
provision of the Constitution and by placing some of the apparent constitutional
analysis in the portion of the opinion that rests on other grounds. One can find in
the opinion possible invocations of the doctrines of due process, equal protection,
separation of powers, and federalism.
Brown, supra note 17, at 657 (footnote omitted). Any suggestion that Erie rests on
statutory grounds comes not from the majority opinion, which expressly disavowed such a
position, see supra note 92, and repeatedly emphasized constitutional considerations. See
Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-79. Rather, the discussion of statutory construction appears in the
separate opinion of Justice Butler, who rejected any need to address any constitutional
question. Id. at 90 (Butler, J., concurring) ("I am of the opinion that the constitutional
validity of the rule need not be considered ... .
94. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
95. See, e.g., id. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
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the heart of Erie.96
It is noteworthy that any implication of forum shopping in the
Erie opinion itself is minimal, restricted largely to two observations.
The first of those observations was that Swift v. Tyson "made rights
enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary according to whether
enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court"97 ; the
second observation was that "[in attempting to promote uniformity
of law throughout the United States, the [Swift v. Tyson] doctrine had
prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the State." 98
Appropriately enough, the Court recognized that although it had
removed the gambit of litigating a state-law-based claim in federal
court to gain access to federal "common law" versus a given state's
common law, other aspects of forum shopping remained unchanged
or were exacerbated. The law applied in different federal courts now
varied by geography. Federal courts in Pennsylvania would apply
different legal rules in diversity cases than the federal courts located
in New Jersey, subject to applicable choice of law principles, despite
the fact that both Pennsylvania and New Jersey are within the Third
Circuit. Moreover, as highlighted by the advent of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, court procedural rules would now vary, depending
on whether the claim was filed in federal versus state court. As the
Supreme Court later recognized, these differences in procedure also
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State .... Congress
has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State .... ); id.
at 79 ("[T]he doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said, 'an unconstitutional
assumption of powers by courts of the United States ...... "); id. ("[T]he authority and
only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own
[whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word."
(citations omitted)).
[N]otwithstanding the frequency with which the [Swift v. Tyson] doctrine has been
reiterated, there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the
Constitution of the United States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy
and independence of the States-independence in their legislative and
independence in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative
or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by
the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any
interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of
the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.
Id. at 78-79.
96. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 551 (5th ed. 1979) (defining federalism as a term
including the "relationship between the states and the federal government"); see also Ely,
supra note 16, at 695 (stating that the Erie decision "implicates, indeed perhaps it is, the
very essence of our federalism").
97. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
98. Id. at 75.
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raised the possibility of a different result. 99
The Supreme Court's next major decision in this area, Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York,1"' explained the Erie decision in a similar fashion:
In essence, the intent of [the Erie] decision was to insure that, in
all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the
outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.
The nub of the policy that underlies Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit
by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State
court a block away should not lead to a substantially different
result. 101
Accordingly, it was not Erie itself, but instead the Court's
subsequent decision in Hanna v. Plumer °2 which, in retrospect,
assigned a "discouragement of forum shopping" purpose to Erie,
describing Erie as "in part[,] a reaction to the practice of 'forumshopping' which had grown up in response to the rule of Swift v.
Tyson. "103
Erie ... , overruling Swift v. Tyson ... , held that federal courts

sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of
"substantive" law, are bound by state court decisions as well as
state statutes. The broad command of Erie was therefore
identical to that of the [Rules] Enabling Act: federal courts are
to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law ....
The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that it would be
unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to
differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court.
"Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to
prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against
those not citizens of the state. Swift v. Tyson introduced grave
discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It made rights
99. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 461-64 (1965) (holding that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure governing service of process, rather than the state rules, apply to
diversity cases filed in federal court, even when application of the Federal Rules might
lead to a different outcome in the federal court).
100. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
101. Id. at 109.
102. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
103. Id. at 467 (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)).
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enjoyed under the unwritten 'general law' vary according to
whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal
court; and the privilege of selecting the court in which the right
should be determined was conferred upon the non-citizen."'"'
But look at what Erie left untouched. Erie did not address
substantive law choices available as among various state courts; Erie's
concern with forum shopping involved a litigant's potential ability to
employ different substantive law depending on whether the lawsuit
was filed in a state or federal court within the same state-whether the
plaintiff through the initial filing of the lawsuit or the defendant
through removal. Because Swift v. Tyson required federal courts to
follow state statutes but not state case law, disputes which, if filed in
state court, would be governed by that state's decisional law, could
instead be filed in federal court and thereby dodge the precedential
effect of unfavorable case law. The practice created a problem with a
constitutional dimension:
[T]he scheme of our Constitution envisions an allocation of
law-making functions between state and federal legislative
processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make
substantive law affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of
Thus, in
congressional legislative powers in this regard.
diversity cases Erie commands that it be the state law governing
primary private activity which prevails. 05
Accordingly, Erie's condemnation of forum shopping involved a
the ability to obtain different
relatively narrow application:
substantive law as between federal and state courts within the same
Indeed, Justice Harlan's concurrence in Hanna
state. 10 6
acknowledged, even endorsed, forum shopping outside Erie's narrow
context, expressly disavowing a broad prohibition: "[F]or a simple
forum-shopping rule also proves too much; litigants often choose a
federal forum merely to obtain what they consider the advantages of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to try their cases before a
Erie and Hanna did not
supposedly more favorable judge." '
criticize (much less prohibit) forum shopping as between (or among)
104. Id. at 465, 467 (citations omitted).
concurring).
105. Id. at 474-75 (Harlan, J.,
106. See Note, supra note 23, at 1682 ("Although the Supreme Court denounces statefederal forum shopping on grounds of comity and parity, it countenances interstate forum
shopping."); see also Brown, supra note 17, at 664 (suggesting that "Erie actually favors"
state-to-state forum shopping).
107. Hanna,380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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states, but instead held only that federalism concerns mandated that
federal courts employ state substantive law. 0 8 Thus, "Type Three"
differences in substantive law, "Type Four" differences in procedural
provisions, and "Type Five" subjective and personal differences
among forums remain game-choices available to plaintiffs and
defendants.
2. The Supreme Court's Repeated Acceptance of Forum Shopping
Absent Federalism Concerns
The narrow reach of the Erie line of cases to encompass only
federal court versus state court forum shopping is sensible and
unsurprising. The Erie line of cases addressed federalism concerns in
the context of the Rules of Decision Act0 9 and the Rules Enabling
Act. 10
Although federal versus state court forum shopping
potentially invokes both Acts, neither Act raises state-to-state forum
shopping issues. If state-to-state forum shopping is indeed a
"problem," it is transfer of venue, rather than the Erie doctrine,
through which the federal courts typically address the problem.
As one might expect, forum shopping regularly arises in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence addressing change of venue. The
Court invoked the prohibition against forum shopping against
defendants' attempts to effect a change in the applicable law through
a change of venue"' in Van Dusen v. Barrack."2 Van Dusen involved
the crash of a commercial airliner in Boston Harbor. The defendants
sought to transfer venue from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to
the District of Massachusetts, where more than 100 other lawsuits
involving the same crash were pending and most of the witnesses

108. The Court's rationale in Erie found a consistent approach in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Klaxon generally requires federal courts
sitting in diversity to follow the conflict of laws rules of the state in which the federal court
sits under the same rationale as Erie-to preserve the principle of uniformity within a
state. Id. at 496.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000) ("The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United

States, in cases where they apply.").
110. Id. § 2072 (noting that the Supreme Court "shall have the power to prescribe

general rules" of practice, procedure, and evidence in the federal district courts and courts
of appeals, but that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right").
111. See id. § 1404(a) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought.").
112. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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resided." 3 Defendants also urged that a transfer of venue should
result in a corresponding change in the applicable law from that of
Pennsylvania to that of Massachusetts.' 1 4 Rejecting this contention,
the Court noted that "[t]he legislative history of § 1404(a) certainly
does not justify the rather startling conclusion that one might get a
change of law as a bonus for a change of venue."'1 5 Instead, the Court
held that a transfer of venue under § 1404(a) 1"simply
... authorize[s]
16
law.
of
change
a
not
courtrooms,"
of
change
a
Despite its critical language, the Van Dusen Court accepted the
underlying reality of forum shopping and the "state-law advantages"
resulting from forum shopping, acknowledging that these rules "allow
plaintiffs to retain whatever advantages may flow from the state laws
of the forum they have initially selected.""' 7
[Section] 1404(a) was not designed to narrow the plaintiff's
venue privilege or to defeat the state-law advantages that might
accrue from the exercise of this venue privilege but rather the
provision was simply to counteract the inconveniences that
flowed from the venue statutes by permitting transfer to a
convenient federal court .... If a change of law were in the
offing, the parties might well regard the section primarily as a
forum-shopping instrument. And, more importantly, courts
would at least be reluctant to grant transfers, despite
considerations of convenience, if to do so might conceivably
prejudice the claim of a plaintiff who had initially selected a
permissible forum."8
The Court noted that in enacting § 1404(a), Congress "was
primarily concerned with the problems arising where, despite the
propriety of the plaintiff's venue selection, the chosen forum was an
inconvenient one.""' 9 The Court also observed that a potential Erie
113. Id. at 614.
114. Id.
115. Id.at 635-36.
116. Id. at 636-37; see also id. at 639 ("[I]n cases such as the present, where the
defendants seek transfer, the transferee district court must be obligated to apply the state
law that would have been applied if there had been no change of venue. A change of
venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of
courtrooms.").
117. Id. at 633.
118. Id. at 635-36; see also id. at 633-34 ("There is nothing.., in the language or policy
of § 1404(a) to justify its use by defendants to defeat the advantages accruing to plaintiffs
who have chosen a forum which, although it was inconvenient, was a proper venue.").
119. Id. at 634.
The effect is to give the plaintiff the benefit which traditionally he has had in the

2006]

THE FORUM GAME

365

issue lurked in transferring venue: Erie sought "an identity or
uniformity between federal and state courts,"'2 ° and "[t]his purpose
would be defeated in cases such as the present if nonresident
defendants, properly subjected to suit in the transferor State
(Pennsylvania), could invoke § 1404(a) to gain the benefits of the laws
of another jurisdiction (Massachusetts).""12 Thus, the Court did not
disturb, and seemed to endorse, the choice of forum and
accompanying choice of law as squarely within the purview and
control of the plaintiff and preserved those choices against the
defendant's preferences resulting from a transfer of venue.'22
More than two decades later, the Court upheld the Van Dusen
result in Ferens v. John Deere Co.,123 in which the change of venue
had been sought by the plaintiffs instead of the defendants. The
Court "again conclude[d] that the transferor law should apply
regardless of who makes the § 1404(a) motion. "124
The text of § 1404(a) may not say anything about choice of law,
but we think it not the purpose of the section to protect a
party's ability to use inconvenience as a shield to discourage or
hinder litigation otherwise proper. The section exists to
eliminate inconvenience 25without altering permissible choices
under the venue statutes.1
Mr. and Mrs. Ferens sued John Deere Company for contract
claims in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and then filed 12a6
second suit for tort claims in the Southern District of Mississippi.
The Ferenses then moved pursuant to § 1404(a) to transfer venue of
the Mississippi action to Pennsylvania-thereby permitting use of the
selection of a forum with favorable choice-of-law rules .... It may be thought
undesirable to let the plaintiff reap a choice-of-law benefit from the deliberate
selection of an inconvenient forum. In a sense this is so, but the alternatives seem
even more undesirable. If the rules of the state where the transferee district is
located were to control, the judge exercising his discretion upon a motion for
transfer might well make a ruling decisive of the merits of the case.
Id. at 637 n.36 (quoting

STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE

AND FEDERAL COURTS 65-66 (Am. L. Inst., Tentative Draft No. 1, 1963)).

120. Id. at 638.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 633; see also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 524-25 (1990)
(noting that Van Dusen permitted a defendant to transfer venue "and at the same time
preserve the plaintiffs state-law advantages").
123. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
124. Id. at 531.
125. Id. at 525.
126. Id. at 519.
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Mississippi statute of limitations for the tort claims, which would have
been time-barred by the Pennsylvania statute of limitations. 27 The
Court expressly acknowledged the "indirect" opportunity for forum
shopping: "The advantage to Mississippi's personal injury lawyers
that resulted from the State's then-applicable 6-year statute of
limitations has not escaped us; Mississippi's long limitation period no
doubt drew plaintiffs to the State.' 12 Yet the potential for such
forum shopping did not give the Court pause:
Our rule may seem too generous because it allows the Ferenses
to have both their choice of law and their choice of forum, or
even to reward the Ferenses for conduct that seems
manipulative. We nonetheless see no alternative rule that
would produce a more acceptable result. Deciding that the
transferee law should apply, in effect, would tell the Ferenses
that they should have continued to litigate their warranty action
in Pennsylvania and their tort action in Mississippi. Some
might find this preferable, but we do not. We have made quite
clear that to permit a situation in which two cases involving
precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in
different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time,
29
energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.1
Indeed, the Court again noted the importance of preserving the
state law advantages accruing to the plaintiff through the forum
shopping process, noting that "if the applicable law were to change
after transfer [of venue], the plaintiff's venue privilege and resulting
state-law advantages could be defeated at the defendant's option."'30
Ferens declined to condemn forum shopping either under the
circumstances of this specific case or as a general matter. The Court
observed that "[a]n opportunity for forum shopping exists whenever a
party has a choice of forums that will apply different laws,"'' and
noted that plaintiffs shop for the forum with the most favorable law as
a matter of course:
No interpretation of § 1404(a) ... will create comparable
opportunities for forum shopping by a plaintiff because, even
without § 1404(a), a plaintiff already has the option of shopping
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

519-20.
528.
531 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
524-25. See also Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 52 (1941)

(stating that "venue is a privilege created by federal statute").
131.

Ferens, 494 U.S. at 527.
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for a forum with the most favorable law. The Ferenses, for
example, had an opportunity for forum shopping in the state
courts because both the Mississippi and Pennsylvania courts
had jurisdiction and because they each would have applied a
different statute of limitations. Diversity jurisdiction did not
eliminate these forum shopping opportunities; instead, under
Erie, the federal courts had to replicate them ....Applying the
transferor law would not give a plaintiff an opportunity to use a
transfer to obtain a law that he could not obtain through his
initial forum selection. If it does make selection of the most
favorable law more convenient, it does no more than recognize
a forum shopping choice that already exists.132
Similarly, in the related area of forum non conveniens, the
Supreme Court has observed that venue statutes "are drawn with a
necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts,"
and affirmed the plaintiff's control over forum selection: "unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed."' 33 Subsequently, in Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno,'13 4 the Supreme Court matter-of-factly acknowledged
that forum shopping is an accepted, integral, and logical part of civil
litigation:
[I]f conclusive or substantial weight were given to the
possibility of a change in law, the forum non conveniens
doctrine would become virtually useless.
Jurisdiction and
venue requirements are often easily satisfied. As a result, many
plaintiffs are able to choose from among several forums.
Ordinarily, these plaintiffs will select that forum whose choiceof-law rules are most advantageous. Thus, if the possibility of
an unfavorable change in substantive law is given substantial
weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry, dismissal would
rarely be proper.'
In the same vein, the Court also noted that a defendant's
motivation in moving to dismiss a lawsuit on the ground of forum non
conveniens may well be to seek a more favorable forum but declined
to discourage such forum shopping:
132. Id. at 527-28.
133. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947); see also Ryan, supra note
37, at 174 (stating that forum non conveniens "is recognized, but only as an exception to
the general rule of plaintiffs choice").
134. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
135. Id. at 250.
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We recognize, of course, that Piper and Hartzell may be
engaged in reverse forum-shopping. However, this possibility
ordinarily should not enter into a trial court's analysis of the
private interests. If the defendant is able to overcome the
presumption in favor of plaintiff by showing that trial in the
chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome, dismissal is
appropriate-regardless of the fact that defendant may also be
motivated by a desire to obtain a more favorable forum.'36
The Court has upheld the practice of shopping among states for
the forum with the most generous statute of limitations on several
occasions,137 notably in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.138 Kathy
Keeton, a New York resident, sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. and others
for libel in a federal district court in New Hampshire. 3 9 Keeton
previously had filed suit in Ohio against Hustler, an Ohio corporation
with its principal place of business in California, but the court
dismissed her claims on statute of limitations grounds.140
New
Hampshire's six-year limitations period for libel claims rendered
"New Hampshire ...the only State where [Keeton's] suit would not
have been time-barred when it was filed.' 14' The Court noted that
Keeton's lawsuit sought damages for the nationwide distribution of
the libelous issues, "even though only a small portion of those copies
were distributed in New Hampshire," '42 but nevertheless permitted
the lawsuit to proceed. "Petitioner's successful search for a State with
a lengthy statute of limitations is no different from the litigation
strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable
substantive or procedural rules or sympathetic local populations."' 4 3
Commentators and politicians seeking a comprehensive
condemnation of forum shopping will not obtain help from the
136. Id. at 252-53 n.19.
137. See, e.g., N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 36 (1995) (upholding the use of
state statutes of limitations, rather than imposing a uniform federal rule for claims under
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act and observing that "the practice
of adopting state statutes of limitations for federal causes of action can result in different
limitations periods in different States for the same federal action, and ...some plaintiffs
will canvass the variations and shop around for a forum. But these are just the costs of the
rule itself"). But see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 156
(1987) (finding state statutes of limitations inappropriate for civil RICO claims and
therefore selecting a uniform federal limitations period of four years).
138. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 772.
Id. at 772 & n.1.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 779.
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Supreme Court's jurisprudence. Instead, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized the existence and the value of forum shopping,
and its jurisprudence shows an inclination to curtail forum shopping
only when mandated by federalism concerns. The forum shopping
discouraged by the Supreme Court is of a limited variety-that
occurring in diversity cases and resulting from substantive law
differences between federal and state courts in the same state.
Benefits or unfairness to one side or the other do not warrant placing
limits on forum shopping. Substantive law differences among the
states is a fact of life and is properly treated as such by the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court's acceptance of state-to-state forum
shopping does not reflect a thoughtless or laissez-faire approach; in
fact, such state-to-state forum shopping is broadly approved, probably
because protections against the most egregious potential abuses are
already in place. Of particular note are the due process limitations on
the exercise of personal jurisdiction and choice of law, and the
statutory limitations on venue,'" which restrict the forums available
to a litigant and restrict a litigant's choices of the substantive law that
can be applied. Personal jurisdiction will exist over a nonresident
defendant only when that defendant's conduct comes within the
language of the state's long-arm statute and additionally satisfies
constitutional due process "minimum contacts" analysis. Similarly,
choice of law is not unlimited. "[F]or a State's substantive law to be
selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair."' 4 5
Any suggestion that the Court should take a more aggressive
stance against state-to-state forum shopping is misguided. The power
of the Supreme Court is constitutionally limited. The Erie line of
cases involved federal statutes-the Rules of Decision Act'4 6 and the
Rules Enabling Act147-as well as notions of federalism. There is no
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2000) (setting forth the venue choices when federal
subject matter jurisdiction is founded solely on diversity); see also id. § 1391(b) (setting
forth the venue choices when federal subject matter jurisdiction is not founded solely on
diversity); id. § 1391(c) (pertaining to corporate defendants).
145. Phillips Petroleum Corp. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion)).
146. See, e.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (interpreting the Rules of
Decision Act).
147. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (interpreting the Rules Enabling
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implication of federal law or constitutional doctrine in state-to-state
forum shopping. Within constitutional parameters, the states are free
to enact their own laws and are not required to conform their laws to
existing laws in other states. The Constitution
recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of
the States-independence in their legislative and independence
in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the
legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case
permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically
authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference
with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the
authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its
independence.148
Accordingly, the attractions of the laws of one state over another
are the inevitable consequence of our governmental structure 49 and
are within the province of the states. Unless state law raises issues of
a constitutional dimension, that state law is beyond the concern of the
federal courts.
In light of differences in state law, lawyers not only do, in fact,
check for the most favorable applicable law, but diligent and ethical
legal practice requires consideration of this factor.

III.

THE ETHICAL RULES AND FORUM SHOPPING AS ZEALOUS
REPRESENTATION

If forum shopping indeed constituted unfair and impermissible
"cheating," one might expect to find a prohibition within the ethical
rules that would authorize the imposition of attorney discipline upon
lawyers who engage in the practice. But although "the nasty phrase
'forum shopping' ... suggests that those who represent their clients'
interests [by engaging in the practice] effectively commit a breach of
professional etiquette,"' 5 ° in fact just the opposite is true. As the
Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct observes, one
of the basic principles underlying the Rules is "the lawyer's obligation
zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within
the bounds of the law."'5 1 This statement summarizes the premise of
148. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S.
368,401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)).
149. See Juenger, supra note 27, at 569 (noting that "our federalism ... invites
intrasystem forum shopping").
150. Id. at 572.
151. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl.

9 (2004).
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this Article: so long as the forum shopping behavior comports with
choices permitted under the law, such behavior should be
supported-and is not subject to sanctions-because it falls within the

legally permissible
choices available to lawyers in furthering their
52
causes.
clients'
The legal profession has several sources of ethical rules. The
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
sets forth ethical rules and guidelines which, together with the former
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, form the basis for most
states' ethical rules. 153 The recently adopted Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers summarizes the existing rules and case
law and also departs from existing authority where the drafters
believed better solutions were available. 154 In addition, the American
Bar Association, and state, county, and local bar associations, publish
formal and informal opinions concerning ethical issues. 55 One of the
most enduring canons of legal ethics-that a lawyer zealously
represent her client within the bounds of the law 56-requires lawyers
152. See Algero, supra note 51, at 106 ("[l]n many cases, an attorney's ethical duty to
his client may include selecting a forum with little connection to the events giving rise to a
cause of action if that forum is an acceptable forum under the law .. ");id. at 107 ("[T]he
attorney's behavior should not be considered unethical when he is proceeding within the
procedural and substantive limits of the law."); id. at 108 ("[E]xcept in those cases in
which attorneys have acted outside of procedural and substantive law, attorneys should be
assured that they are acting ethically when they abide by the law in selecting a forum.");
see also Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29
TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 322 (1994) ("Forum-shoppingis not a disparaging term; it is part of a
litigator's job.").
153. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2004) (providing current
rules of professional conduct); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1982)

(providing now superseded rules of professional conduct). Thirty-nine states, plus the
District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands, have adopted the Model Rules; with the
exception of California, the remaining states base their standards on the Model Code. See
COMPENDIUM OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 517, at 7-8 & inside
back cover (1997). California has adopted neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code.
See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2004).
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000); see also
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS, at xxii (2000) ("In many instances, ... the Restatement significantly departs

from the code formulations. These departures are carefully considered and were
extensively debated. As those of us involved in the drafting of the codes will testify, many
of these departures simply clarify the intendment of the code provisions and others seek to
supersede drafting mistakes. Other departures reflect recognition that experience with the
codes revealed that better resolutions were to be had on a variety of issues.").
155. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Formal Ethics Opinions, available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/ethicopinions.html; State Bar of Cal., Ethics Opinions, available at
http://calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-_generic.jsp?cid=101330id=1,129.
156.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (noting "the lawyer's obligation

zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of the
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to seek the law most favorable to their clients' interests, that is, to
forum shop.
Several ethical rules are relevant to this inquiry, including the
rules pertaining to competence, diligence, and meritorious claims.
Model Rule 1.1 addresses competence, providing that "[a] lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." '57 Model
Rule 1.3 addresses diligence, providing that "[a] lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."1" 8
Model Rule 3.1 addresses meritorious claims and contentions,
providing, in pertinent part:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law. 15 9
The Comments to these rules provide additional guidance.
Comment (1) to Model Rule 1.3 explains:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite
opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the
lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are
required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests
of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf.16 °
Similarly, Comment (1) to Model Rule 3.1 provides that "[t]he
advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of
the client's cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The
law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within

law"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 ("The duty of a lawyer, both to
his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of
the law.
); CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (1967) ("The lawyer owes 'entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,' to the end that nothing be taken
or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied.").
157. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
158. Id. R. 1.3.
159. Id. R. 3.1.
160. Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
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which an advocate may proceed. ' 161 Comment (2) explains that an
action is frivolous "if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith
argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action
taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law. ' 162
Taken together, these rules and
comments establish the ethical foundation relevant to selecting a
forum.
All of these ethical rules support the practice of forum shopping;
forum shopping would be improper only when the claim was frivolous
or no good-faith rationale could justify the selection of a particular
forum. The ethical rules require lawyers to research thoroughly the
potential forum choices available and evaluate the pros and cons of
each forum, including the substantive law, procedural rules, and local
rules. When more than one forum is legally authorized, the lawyer
must take into account which forum is more favorable to the client's
cause in selecting the forum in which to file suit.163 Opportunities of
choice in turn afford opportunities to strategize. The opportunity for
strategic behavior implicates both games and rules.
IV. THE FORUM GAME: GAME THEORY AND THE RATIONALITY OF
FORUM SHOPPING

The intensity of the negative rhetoric invoked against forum
shopping reflects an underlying belief that forum shopping is unfair,
irrational, unethical, and improper. If the law generally, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence specifically, and the ethical rules do not
prohibit-and, in fact, condone-forum shopping, the next question is
whether there is some form of irrationality or faulty decisionmaking
at work within the practice of forum shopping."6 Decisionmaking is a
161. Id. R. 3.1 cmt. 1.
[Comment 1 to Rule 3.1] describes well the pressures on the attorney and
illustrates why attorneys should not be and cannot be expected to refrain from
forum shopping within the procedural rules when doing so is in their client's best
interest. This comment indicates that actions taken within the procedural and
substantive rules for the benefit of a client are ethical so long as they do not
constitute an abuse of legal procedure.
Algero, supra note 51, at 106.
162. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2.

163. See Russell J. Weintraub, Introduction to Symposium on International Forum
Shopping, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463, 463 (2002) ("It is part of a lawyer's job to bring suit in
the forum that is best for the client's interests.").
164. Concerns regarding irrationality, and irrational results in particular, are, of course,
found in the related area of conflict of laws. See Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law-Interest
Analysis: They Still Don't Get It, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1121, 1134-36 (1994) (discussing
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Although, at its core,

166
decisionmaking merely means reaching a judgment or conclusion,
scholars study the process through which conclusions are reached for
evaluative and predictive purposes. 167 Thus, when initial research
reveals that the legal prerequisites for filing suit can be satisfied in

more than one forum, the multiple options implicate choice and
inherent in litigation 169
decisionmaking. 168 Moreover, the uncertainty
170
draws in strategy and risk-taking behavior.

In evaluating the available options in the decisionmaking
process, analysis under rational choice theory has tended to

predominate. 171 Rational choice theory, as its name suggests, assumes
treatment of foreign choice-of-law rules under interest analysis as designed to avoid
"irrational" results); Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1631, 1651 (2005) (describing "irrationality in choice of law" as "intractable").
165. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1, 1 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000)
(noting that "the topic of decision making is shared by many disciplines, from mathematics
and statistics, through economics and political science, to sociology and psychology").
166. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 366 (2d college ed. 1982) (defining
decision as "a judgment or conclusion reached or given").
167. See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1115, 1115 (2003) ("Nearly every action we take and nearly every decision we make
involve consequences we cannot foresee. To understand how people behave in an
uncertain world, and to make viable recommendations about how the law should try to
shape that behavior, legal scholars must employ, even if only implicitly, a model or theory
of decisionmaking."); see also DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 1, at 36-37 (noting that game
theory can be used for explanation, prediction, and prescription purposes).
168. See MICHAEL W. EYSENCK & MARK T. KEANE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 475
(4th ed. 2000) (noting that "decision making is concerned with choosing among options").
169. See Amos Tversky & Craig R. Fox, Weighing Risk and Uncertainty, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 165, at 93 ("Decisions are generally made without
definite knowledge of their consequences. The decision[] ... to go to court [is] generally
made without knowing in advance whether... the court will decide in one's favor.").
170. See Guthrie, supra note 167, at 1122 (noting that "litigation is an uncertain process
requiring litigants to make risky decisions"); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 165, at 1
("[A]nalyses of decision making commonly distinguish risky and riskless choices.");
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
113, 114 (1996) ("Every litigant gambles. When they choose to file suit, take discovery,
file motions, decline settlement offers, and appeal, they take chances.").
171. See Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 165, at 758 ("The assumption that agents
are rational is central to much theory in the social sciences. Its role is particularly obvious
in economic analysis, where it supports the useful corollary that no significant opportunity
will remain unexploited."); Sunstein, supra note 69, at 1 (noting that rational choice
models "have dominated the social sciences, including the economic analysis of law"). See
generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE:
THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY 67, 89 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) ("The

assumption of rationality has a favored position in economics. It is accorded all the
methodological privileges of a self-evident truth, a reasonable idealization, a tautology,
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that decisionmakers evaluate options rationally and act to maximize
their goals and preferences,17 2 seeking what is sometimes referred to
as "outcome maximization." '73
Variants of rational choice theory include expected utility theory
and wealth maximization theory. Expected utility theory posits "that
decision makers conduct an explicit or implicit cost-benefit analysis of
competing options and select the optimal method of achieving their
goals (that is, the method that maximizes expected benefits and
minimizes expected costs, or maximizes net expected benefits),
subject to external constraints."'7 4 Similarly, wealth maximization
theory specifically predicts that decisionmakers will seek to maximize
profits or financial well-being. 75 Thus, in the forum shopping
context, the most logical choice under rational choice theory is to
select the forum potentially offering the more favorable outcome,
which thereby will maximize the client's economic welfare. Forum
shopping is a strategy for the purpose of finding the most favorable
set of rules for litigation.
Rational choice theory offers valuable insights, especially into
certain types of legal decisionmaking.176 Indeed, inadequate attention
and a null hypothesis .... The advantage of the rational model is compounded because
no other theory of judgment and decision can ever match it in scope, power, and
simplicity.").
172. See NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW:
FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 57 (1997) (noting the basic assumption within law
and economics that "individuals are rational maximizers of their satisfactions in their
nonmarket as well as their market behavior"); Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or
Multiple Selves?: Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 24 (1997)
(noting that "man is a rational maximizer of his ends"); Richard A. Posner, The Economic
Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 761 (1973) ("The basis of an economic approach
to law is the assumption that the people involved with the legal system act as rational
maximizers of their satisfactions.").
173. See Guthrie, supra note 167, at 1115-16 ("Rational choice theory, which describes
how people would behave if they followed the dictates of a series of logical axioms, posits
that people make outcome-maximizing decisions."); see also Eldar Shafir & Amos
Tversky, Decision Making, in FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY § 26.6, at 614
(Daniel J. Levitin ed., 2002) ("The rational theory of choice assumes that each alternative
has a utility or subjective value for the decision maker. Given a set of options, the
decision maker selects the alternative with the highest value.").
174. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (2000).
Expected utility theory is expressed mathematically as "[e]xpected utility = (probability of
a given outcome) x (utility of the outcome)." EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 168, at 483.
175. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 174, at 1066 ("IN]early all law-and-economics
literature on business organizations ...is built on the explicit or implicit assumption that
firms seek to maximize profits. And much law-and-economics literature on individual
behavior makes an analogous assumption .. ").
176. Law and economics' use of rational choice theory has come under attack for its

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

has been paid to the impact and significance of the specific type of

legal decisionmaking at issue.
Significant differences in the
decisionmaking process exist between, for example, settlement
decisions and forum selection decisions. One difference is the nature
of the game: settlement decisions are usually characterized as a nonperfect rationality assumption and corresponding failure to account for human
irrationality. See Guthrie, supra note 167, at 1116 ("Rational-choice-based analyses of law
and legal behavior have been enormously influential, but legal scholars have begun to
question the wisdom of relying on them because there is 'too much credible experimental
evidence that individuals frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the
assumptions of' the theory."); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998) ("The project of behavioral law and
economics ... is to take the core insights and successes of economics and build upon them
by making more realistic assumptions about human behavior."); Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 174, at 1056 ("The shortcomings of rational choice theory have become more
apparent. Behavioral anomalies and puzzles that rational choice theory (at least relatively
strong versions) cannot explain--once little noticed because of the considerable utility
rational choice theory did have-began to appear more significant as the economic
analysis of law gained influence within the legal community"); Rachlinski, supra note 170,
at 114 ("Litigants' decisionmaking under risk and uncertainty may not comport with
rational theories of behavior."); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in
Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES, supra note 165, at 44 ("Expected utility theory reigned for several decades as the
dominant normative and descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty, but it
has come under serious question in recent years. There is now general agreement that the
theory does not provide an adequate description of individual choice: a substantial body
of evidence shows that decision makers systematically violate its basic tenets."). These
criticisms have led to the modification of law and economics with psychological concepts,
coined "behavioral law and economics."
See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra, at 1477-80
(incorporating the behavioral concepts of bounded rationality and bounded willpower);
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 174, at 1075-1112 (incorporating numerous psychological
concepts, including bounded rationality, the representativeness heuristic, the availability
heuristic, hindsight bias, anchoring and adjustment bias, the framing effect, and status quo
bias); see also Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1748 (1998) ("Behavioral law and economics does not attempt to
undo any of the remarkable accomplishments of law and economics. Rather, it is an
attempt to refine."). See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000) (compiling articles critical of law and economics' pure rationality assumption
and integrating psychological concepts). However, behavioral law and economics has
been criticized for going too far in the other direction by "treat[ing] all legal actors in all
situations as if they were equally predisposed to commit errors of judgment and choice."
Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Tradedfor
Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 69 (2002); see id. at
77 (criticizing proponents of "behavioral law and economics" for relying on "selective and
convenient interpretations of a limited data set"). Professor Mitchell notes, in particular,
that individual and situational differences affect rationality in decisionmaking. See id. at
98-105 (discussing individual differences); id. at 105-09 (discussing situational
differences); id. at 87 ("[D]epending on the characteristics of the individual and the system
of thought activated in a particular decisionmaking situation, the behavior of different
groups of individuals and the behavior of the same individual over time may vary
considerably, from perfect rationality to seeming irrationality.").
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zero-sum game, meaning that all the players can win,177 whereas
litigation is a zero-sum game, meaning that one party wins only if the
other party loses. 1 78 Another important difference is the ultimate
decisionmaker: settlement decisions rest with the client, 7 9 whereas
procedural and tactical decisions-including forum selection-rest
with the lawyer. 8 ' When the client-the litigant himself-is the
decisionmaker, the client's lack of familiarity with litigation and
intense personal stake in the litigation can increase fear and decrease
the willingness to take risks.' When the lawyer is the decisionmaker,
however, he or she typically sits in a very different position from the
client-which has distinct implications for the decisionmaking
182
process.
177. See David Straus, Facilitated Collaborative Problem Solving and Process
Management, in NEGOTIATION:

STRATEGIES FOR MUTUAL GAIN 28, 29 (Lavinia Hall

ed., 1993) ("Negotiation, mediation, facilitation, and collaborative problem solving are all
examples of consensus-based win-win approaches.").
178. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that situations where "[olne
player's gain is the other's loss" are zero-sum games); id. ("[T]he idea [in zero-sum games]
is that the players' interests are in complete conflict."); Straus, supra note 177, at 31
(noting that "taking disputes to courts" is classified a "win-lose" approach).
179. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2004) ("A lawyer shall abide

by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.").
180. See id. R. 1.2 cmt. 2 ("Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of
their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives,
particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters.").
181. See Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7
(2002) (noting that, according to rational choice theory, "individual litigants are presumed
to be risk averse"); accord EYSENCK & KEANE, supra note 168, at 485 (noting that
"choices that seem generally desirable are avoided if they produce anticipated regret");
see also Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 89 ("The Regret Aversion Theory views litigants as regret-averse
human beings who settle their cases at least in part to avoid the unpleasant feeling of
regret.").
182. The lawyer is an agent for the client, and thus in most cases is more emotionally
detached from the litigation than is the client, who has the more direct and more personal
stake. Yet despite a lessened emotional involvement in the litigation, the lawyer
nevertheless typically retains significant financial and reputational interests in the
litigation, which tend to encourage rationality by encouraging outcome maximization-the
seeking of the most favorable outcome. Rational choice theory, therefore, will tend to
yield more consistent results when the legal decision at stake is forum selection than when
the legal decision at stake is settlement, which potentially implicates additional distracting
cognitive psychology factors. See Korobkin, supra note 181, at 12-13 (discussing
implications of egocentric bias on settlement); id. at 31-34 (discussing implications of
anchoring and framing on settlement). See generally DAVID G. MYERS, PSYCHOLOGY
394-95 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing the psychological concept of framing); Shafir & Tversky,
supra note 173, at 601-10 (discussing cognitive psychology concepts of risk, framing, and
loss aversion as factors in decisionmaking); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 1, 14-18 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds.,
1982) (discussing cognitive psychology concepts of adjustment and anchoring in
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The strategy involved in forum selection also implicates game
theory.'83
When you think carefully before you act-when you are aware
of your objectives or preferences and of any limitations or
constraints on your actions and choose your actions in a
calculated way to do the best according to your own criteriayou are said to be behaving rationally. Game theory adds
another dimension to rational behavior-namely, interaction
with other equally rational decision makers. In other words,
game theory is the science of rational behavior in interactive
situations.8 4
Generally speaking, game theory is a collection of
decisionmaking models.'85 Game theory has been applied to lawyers'
behavior in litigation, but has tended to focus on factors influencing
litigation versus settlement. 86 However, the basic concepts in game
theory also apply to forum selection.
In the context of forum selection, the game theory issue is how
the availability of more than one legal forum affects decisions
decisionmaking).
183. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1 (1994) ("Legal
scholars have long recognized the need to take account of strategic behavior. Too often,
however, they have not taken advantage of the formal tools of game theory to analyze
strategic behavior .... "); id. at 46 ("If a problem does not involve strategic behavior, we
should not bring the tools of game theory to bear upon it."). See generally MORTON D.
DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION (1983) (discussing game
theory concepts); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS:
INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1985) (same); J.D. WILLIAMS, THE COMPLEAT
STRATEGYST (1982) (same).

184. DIX1T & SKEATH, supra note 1, at 5; see also David Glenn, Nobel Prize in
Economics Goes to 2 Scholars Who Developed Game Theory as Analytical Tool in Public
Policy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 10, 2005, at 1 (reporting the award of the Nobel
Prize in Economic Science to two game theorists, and explaining that "game theory
provides a pervasive mode of analysis of human interaction").
185. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern are credited with developing the
foundations of game theory. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944). "[G]ame theory is primarily a
product of mathematicians and not of scientists from the empirical fields." LUCE &
RAIFFA, supra note 183, at 3.
The foundations of game theory were laid by John von Neumann, who in 1928
proved the basic minimax theorem, and with the publication in 1944 of the Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior the field was established. It was shown that
social events can best be described by models taken from suitable games of
strategy. These games in turn are amenable to thorough mathematical analysis.
Oskar Morgenstern, Foreword to DAVIS, supra note 183, at x.
186. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 183, at 266-67.
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regarding where to file suit.18 7 Game theory encompasses both
sequential-move games, in which the player makes choices by
calculating the future consequences, as well as the more highly
publicized simultaneous-move games, in which the player makes
choices by a more complicated anticipatory and predictive process of
evaluating the opposing player's beliefs regarding what the first
player thinks (the "he thinks that I think that he thinks" process).188
The moves in forum selection are sequential, so choices are made by
calculating the future consequences. The "normal form game," also
known as the "strategic form" of a game, posits three elements: (1)
the players, (2) the available strategies, and (3) the payoff for each
strategy or possible combination of strategies.18 9 The players in forum
shopping include the plaintiff(s) and counsel, the defendant(s) and
counsel, and any anticipated additional participants. 9°
Strategies in forum selection tend to vary because the number of
forums and their respective advantages and disadvantages will vary
from lawsuit to lawsuit.' 91 However, for the purposes of this Article, a
limited strategy space is appropriate as an example because only a
binary choice is necessary to make the point. The aspect of forum

shopping that generates the most criticism is the filing of suit in the
forum believed to offer the potential for the most favorable outcome,
rather than the forum most convenient or having the most obvious
187. The availability of more than one forum is, of course, essential. If only one forum
provides the requisite subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue, no
choice is available and thus no strategy is implicated.
188. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 1, at 20.
The distinction between sequential and simultaneous moves is important because
the two types of games require different types of interactive thinking. In a
sequential move game, each player must think: if I do this, how will my opponent
react? Your current move is governed by your calculation of its future
consequences. With simultaneous moves, you have the trickier task of trying to
figure out what your opponent is going to do right now. But you must recognize
that, in making his own calculation, the opponent is also trying to figure out your
current move, while at the same time recognizing that you are doing the same with
him.
Id. (italics in original). Accordingly, game theory encompasses both sequential-move
games, "where you must look ahead to act now," as well as simultaneous-move games,
"where you must square the circle of 'he thinks that I think that he thinks ....
Id. at 21.
189. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 183, at 8.
190. Examples of such additional participants could include third-party defendants
added under Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or anticipated
intervenors under Rule 24, among others.
191. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 183, at 245 ("Altering the sequence or the number
of moves in a game has a dramatic effect on the likely course of play. Hence, the effects of
even small changes in the rules of civil procedure are often significant.").
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connection to the litigation.192 Accordingly, a full strategy space
articulating every conceivable strategy is unnecessary because a more
focused approach will address the heart of the underlying debate.
Thus, in this model, the lawyer has two choices, both of which satisfy
the subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and venue
prerequisites-either (1) to file suit in the forum that has more
favorable substantive law,193 but seemingly has fewer connections to
the claim, or (2) to file suit in the forum appearing to have more
connections to the claim, but has less favorable substantive law.
"Connections" to the litigation might include, among other factors,
where the cause of action arose, the location of witnesses or other
evidence, or the location of the defendant.
The third element is the payoff structure. "Each player's aim in
the game will be to achieve as high a payoff for himself as possible."1 94
Filing suit in the forum having the more favorable substantive law has
the potential payoff of a higher recovery, with the potential
consequence that the defendant may move to transfer venue. Of
course, there is no certainty that the defendant would file such a
motion, nor any certainty that a court would grant the motion. Filing
suit in the forum that appears to have more connections to the claim,
but less favorable substantive law, has the potential payoff of
reducing the likelihood that the defendant will move to transfer
venue but does not eliminate the possibility altogether, especially if
the "connection" favors the plaintiff. If the defendant does not move
to transfer venue, or the court denies the motion, the plaintiff is stuck
with this forum, which carries the consequences of less favorable
substantive law and-depending on exactly how "less favorable" the
substantive law is-presents the potential for reducing the chance of
prevailing at trial or reducing the likely recovery amount. Moreover,
if the "connection" is that the forum is where the defendant is
192. See Moore & Parisi, supra note 50, at 1334 (noting that "the most favorable forum
...often is not the closest or most convenient location").
193. See Algero, supra note 51, at 88 ("A review of reported cases in which forum
shopping has been discussed reveals that the most common motive for forum shopping is
selection of the law to be applied to the case."). Some have suggested that the potential
for a sympathetic court (whether judge or jury), rather than a difference in substantive
law, is the more important factor in forum selection. See Whitten, supra note 44, at 564
(asserting that "non-choice-of-law factors, such as sympathetic juries, [are] more
important in a plaintiff's selection of a forum than choice-of-law doctrine"). However,
even if a sympathetic court, rather than more favorable substantive law, is indeed the
more important factor in forum selection, precisely the same rational choice theory and
game theory analysis will apply because both encompass the same notions of increased
recovery and more favorable outcome.
194. DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 1, at 29.
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located, this may provide an additional benefit to the defendant, and
an additional detriment to the plaintiff. The game diagram might
look like this:195
Forum 2
Forum 1
("connections" to claim)
(favorable substantive law)
Plaintiff

100

-100

-100

100

Defendant
The next step is to solve the game.
Games are solved through the use of solution concepts, that is,
general precepts about how rational parties are likely to choose
strategies and about the characteristics of these strategies given the
players' goals. Solving a game is the process of identifying which
strategies the players are likely to adopt.
We must begin by making a fundamental assumption about how
individuals make choices: Individuals are rational in the sense that
they consistently prefer outcomes with higher payoffs to those with
lower payoffs. 9 6
"[P]layers compare their payoffs under a strategy relative to their
' and thus "[p]layers choose the
own payoffs under other strategies,"197
strategies that maximize their own payoffs."19' 8 Rational choice theory
is incorporated in many game theory models,'99 and as discussed
195. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 183, at 46 ("The two-by-two bimatrix ...

[is] well

suited to analyzing the way legal rules affect the behavior of players when each must make
decisions without knowing what the other will do."). The ascribed values in the diagram
reflect the zero-sum nature of the game. The more favorable substantive law enhances the
plaintiff's chances both of winning and of obtaining a larger recovery, and correspondingly
minimizes the defendant's chances of winning or of a minimal verdict. Similarly, filing in
the forum with more connections to the litigation but less favorable substantive law
enhances the defendant's chances of winning or of a minimal verdict, and correspondingly
minimizes the plaintiff's chances of winning or of obtaining a larger recovery. Thus, the
plaintiff's odds of winning or the plaintiff's damages award can be affected by the choice
of forum. Accordingly, the choice of forum carries potential implications for actual loss to
the plaintiff.
196. Id. at 11 ("The basic assumption at the heart of this mode of analysis is not that
individuals are self-interested profit-maximizers or care only about money, but rather that
they act in a way that is sensible for them given their own tastes and predilections.").
197. Id. at 19.
198. Id.; see also DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 1, at 32 (noting that game theory
assumes "that each player is a rational maximizer").
199. MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION To GAME THEORY 4 (2004); see also
DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 1, at 30 ("Game theory assumes that all players are
rational.").
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earlier, posits that decisionmakers "choose[] the best action according
2°
to [their] preferences, among all the actions available to [them].""
As illustrated in the diagram, the plaintiff benefits by selecting the
forum with the more favorable substantive law, and receives no
benefit-indeed, actually suffers loss-by selecting the alternative
forum. Choosing the forum with more connections but less favorable
substantive law costs the plaintiff-either in terms of the ability to
recover altogether or the ability to recover a higher amount.
Choosing the forum with the more favorable substantive law is the
only rational choice because it maximizes the plaintiff's potential
outcome. Any other choice benefits the defendant-not the plaintiff.
The possibility of settlement changes nothing with respect to
strategy and payoff considerations. Most cases settle, 0 1 which might
initially seem to suggest that the choice of forum carries less
significance because the more favorable substantive law would not be
put to the test of trial. However, the choice of forum frames the
settlement negotiations as the parties evaluate the risks and benefits
of litigation versus settlement. Filing the lawsuit in a more favorable
forum gives the plaintiff greater bargaining power in settlement
negotiations due to the potential for a more favorable outcome, while
also securing that more favorable forum for litigation should
negotiations fail.20 2
Applying rational choice theory to the process of forum selection
when two or more forums are legitimate options for filing suit (or for
transferring an existing suit), the rational lawyer will choose the
"best" forum, typically meaning the forum that the lawyer believes
will offer the potential for a more favorable outcome.0 3 If the lawyer
200. OSBORNE, supra note 199, at 4; see also BAIRD ET AL., supra note 183, at 11, 19

("Players choose the strategies that maximize their own payoffs. Hence, players compare
their payoffs under a strategy relative to their own payoffs under other strategies.");
Pamela H. Bucy, Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act: Iterated Games and CloseKnit Groups, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1021, 1027 (2004) ("[G]ame theory assumes that
decisionmakers are rational actors who pursue their self-interest. Game theory further

assumes that when making decisions, actors take into account what they expect other
rational self-interested decisionmakers to do.").
201. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 183, at 246 ("Most litigants do, in fact, settle."); see
also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial An Examinationof Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (documenting that the
portion of federal civil cases proceeding to trial has dropped to 1.8%).
202. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 183, at 245 (noting that "[t]he rights that parties
have at trial ... determine the terms of settlement").
203. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 204 n.72 (1983)

("Rational behavior to an economist is a matter of consequences rather than intentions
see.);also Ghei & Parisi, supra note 43, at 1378 ("A rational party will choose the
forum that is most likely to yield a favorable outcome."); id. at 1378 n.61 (noting that the
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discerns no likely difference in the potential outcome as between (or
among) forums, the lawyer will base the decision on other factors,
such as greater personal convenience to the plaintiff (or greater
inconvenience to the defendant) or the lawyer's greater familiarity
with the applicable local rules. Accordingly, although rational choice
theory and game theory do not independently render forum shopping
legitimate or ethical, °4 these economic theories do address any
potential concerns regarding irrationality or faulty decisionmaking.
Rational choice theory and game theory support the underlying
rationality of shopping for the forum that offers the potential for the
most favorable outcome.
The law regularly provides more than one authorized, legitimate
forum in which a litigant's claims may be heard. To shop among
those legitimate choices for the forum that offers the potential for the
most favorable outcome is the only rational decision under rational
choice theory and game theory because forum shopping maximizes
the client's expected payoff. Maximizing the client's expected payoff
is also a lawyer's obligation under the ethical rules. Accordingly,
forum shopping is a legitimate, rational, ethical practice endorsed and
required by the rules of professional conduct. The sanctioning of
forum shopping would be authorized under only two circumstances.
The first of these circumstances is when forum shopping is
accompanied by impermissible activity, such as when a lawyer initially
files the lawsuit in a forum obviously lacking subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or venue, or when a lawsuit is
dismissed with prejudice but the lawyer refiles the action in a
different court without acknowledging the bar of res judicata. °5 The
second of these circumstances is when the sanctioning of forum
shopping has expressly been authorized, which is the subject of the
next Part.

party selecting the forum "will choose one that maximize[s] expected net benefits").
204. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 1, at 30 ("[Bleing rational does not mean having
the same value system as other players, or sensible people, or ethical or moral people
would use; it means merely pursuing one's own value sysetm consistently.").
205. See Algero, supra note 51, at 108 ("The published cases in which attorneys have
been sanctioned for forum shopping have involved attorneys who have shopped for better
results for their clients after courts have ruled against their clients. The attorneys have
essentially ignored the rulings of the original courts and have shopped for better results,
not by filing appeals, but by filing independent actions."); see also Juenger, supra note 27,
at 558 (noting that before the passage of legislation, the possibility of relitigating child
custody determinations sometimes led to the kidnapping of the child by the non-custodial
parent to another forum).
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V. THE MYTHS UNDERLYING THE PERCEPTION OF FORUM
SHOPPING AS "CHEATING"

If forum shopping involves legitimate choice under the law and
the ethical rules, and constitutes a rational decision under rational
choice theory and game theory, why does the practice have a bad
name? The intense reaction evoked by forum shopping is the result
of unexamined assumptions. The level of antipathy toward forum
shopping implies that the practice constitutes some sort of "cheating,"
amounting to a subversion of justice. Examining this notion yields
several possibilities: (1) forum shopping for a potentially more
favorable result is itself cheating-which implies that only one
"proper" forum exists for any given lawsuit; (2) the "law," and
penalties for violating the law, are consistent across forums, and thus
efforts to obtain a more favorable outcome necessarily implicate
some form of cheating; and (3) forum shopping to obtain a more
favorable result undermines justice's fairness and impartiality by
suggesting that justice is subject to manipulation. All of these
assumptions are flawed, as explained below.
A.

The "One ProperForum" Myth

If only one proper forum existed for any given lawsuit,
attempting to subvert that forum by initially filing suit in, or
subsequently transferring the suit to, a different forum in order to
obtain a more favorable outcome would suggest a form of "cheating"
20 6
that would justify current animosity toward forum shopping.
Typically, however, more than one legitimate option is available.2 7
206. The notion of "one proper forum" reflects the largely-repudiated lex loci
approach to choice of law:
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, choice of law decisions and
thinking came to be dominated by a vested-rights approach: only the jurisdiction
where the dispute arose was capable of giving parties the right to contest a dispute
in court. This model provided the intellectual foundation for the traditional
approach to conflict of laws cases, embodied in the First Restatement of Conflict of
Laws by Reporter Joseph Beale, and variously described as the territorial, situs or
lex loci approach. The suit was controlled by the substantive law of the place
where the tort or the injury occurred, where land was located, where a contract
was consummated or was to be performed, and the like.
Solimine, supra note 44, at 51; see id. at 54 (noting that "by 1989, only fourteen states still
adhered" to the lex loci approach); see also supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text
(discussing choice of law principles).
207. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing choices between federal
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By virtue of providing for the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and
state courts for most claims, authorizing the constitutional reach of
personal jurisdiction to wherever defendants have "minimum
contacts," and providing multiple acceptable options for venue,
multiple legitimate forums for filing suit will necessarily follow.
Therefore, by its very nature, the law supports a lawyer's selection of
one forum over another.
B.

The "One Proper Law" Myth

States create their own substantive and procedural laws. Each
state has a long-arm statute, in which the state legislature has defined
the state's potential reach over nonresident defendants. 20 8 Each state
has one or more venue statutes, in which the state legislature has
defined the parameters for appropriately suing in that state. 20 9 And
each state has numerous statutes setting forth that state's substantive
law in a broad variety of subject matter areas, including crimes, torts,
contracts, property, taxation, environmental, and myriad other
areas. 210 Although many federal laws with a nationwide uniform
application exist, federal law is not the norm. Most lawmaking is left
to the states. State legislatures consider their state's strengths,
weaknesses, goals, policies, finances, and powerbrokers, and craft
laws tailored to their state's needs. State autonomy is part of the
constitutional equation:
the federal government has limited,
specifically enumerated powers, and all other powers rest with the
states.211
As a result of their independence and autonomy, laws vary from
state to state.
Some states have enacted laws more protective of

and state courts and among states).
208. See CASAD, supra note 24, app. B (setting forth state long-arm statutes).
209. See id. § 6:05, at 6-10 to -11 ("If the defendant is sued in a state court that the
defendant feels is inconvenient, but which is not so inconvenient that it would be a denial
of due process to force the defendant to defend there, the defendant cannot seek to have
the case transferred to a state court in another state. The defendant can move to have the
suit dismissed for forum non conveniens, but for such a motion to succeed, the court must
be convinced that the forum is seriously inconvenient.")
210. See J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law,
13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 333 (1967) ("The lack of uniformity in state substantive law,
compounded by proliferation of state long-arm statutes, has made forum-shopping, among
both federal and state courts, a national legal pastime.").
211. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the states those powers not specifically
delegated to the United States).
212. See Brown, supra note 17, at 664 ("American common law will often vary from
state to state, reflecting both the differences in state values and the different organs used
to express those values. These differences comprise one of the hallmarks of our system.").
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environmental concerns and carrying stiffer penalties for violations.213
Some states impose hefty state income taxes, while other states
impose no state income taxes at all.214 Some states have enacted laws
intended to encourage businesses to incorporate or locate operations
there. 5' Some states have enacted statutory caps on certain kinds of
damages." 6 The list goes on and on. In each instance, state
legislatures have expressed priorities, goals, or concerns specific to
their electorate, to their state's circumstances (financial and
otherwise), and perhaps more cynically, to their most powerful
special interest groups." 7 Accordingly, there is no such thing as one
proper law because "the law" varies from state to state.
Differences in the applicable law can lead, not surprisingly, to
different outcomes.2 18 Research has demonstrated the practical
reality that choice of forum influences litigation outcomes. For
example, a study by Professors Kevin Clermont and Theodore
Eisenberg employing a thirteen-year database of three million federal
213. See, e.g., Robert F. Gruenig, Killington Mountain and Act 250: An Eco-Legal
Perspective, 26 VT. L. REV. 543, 544 (2002) (describing Vermont's Land Use and
Development Law, known as Act 250, as "promot[ing] economic growth while preserving
and protecting the state's environmental and ecological integrity"); Clifford
Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First Century: Harnessingthe
Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV. 775, 784 (2004) (noting that New
Hampshire "relied heavily on informal [environmental] enforcement practices and that
penalties were sought against only a few of the worst violators each year").
214. See, e.g., William A. Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging
Corporate Investors To Sell Patents, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1136 (2004) (noting that
"some states with particularly high corporate income tax rates are: Iowa 12%; North
Dakota 10.5%; Pennsylvania 9.99%; and Minnesota 9.8%"); Carolyn Joy Lee, Mergers
and Acquisitionsfrom A to Z: Overview of State and Local Tax Considerations,PLI Order
No. 5830, Jan. 2005, at 124 (noting that Florida has no state income tax, whereas New
York imposes a "sizeable" state income tax). See generally STATE TAX GUIDE-ALL
STATES (CCH) 15-100, at 3513-10 (stating that Texas has no state income tax).
215. See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care
Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 65 (1990) (discussing a Delaware
statute limiting directors' liability and the resultant reincorporation of many businesses in
Delaware).
216. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997) (imposing $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering, in medical malpractice cases); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(b)(1) (2001) (limiting all damages except medical expenses in
medical malpractice cases); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (Michie Supp. 2003) (capping
total general damages in medical malpractice cases).
217. See Darwin Farrar, In Defense of Home Rule: California'sPreemption of Local
Firearms Regulation, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 51, 53 (1996) (noting that "well-funded
special interest groups can play a significant role in the development or demise of state
legislation").
218. See Ghei & Parisi, supra note 43, at 1368 ("[T]he fact that more than one state can
legitimately exercise jurisdiction over the parties creates the possibility that the outcome
depends on the choice of forum.").
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cases concluded that a plaintiff's rate of winning is fifty-eight percent
in cases remaining in the forum where originally filed, but drops to
twenty-nine percent in cases transferred to a different forum.2 1 9 Thus,
in some cases, forum selection may affect the litigation outcome.
The notion of forum "shopping" implies that some factors
considered in deciding where to file an action are improper. In
particular, shopping for favorable law carries a negative connotation,
suggesting that a difference in law is an illegitimate, unfair
consideration akin to dealing from the bottom of the deck. If the
"law" was indeed "the law," rendering consistent findings of liability
and consistent consequences, attempting to subvert the one
appropriate outcome by seeking to obtain a more favorable outcome
would suggest a form of "cheating" that would justify animosity
toward forum shopping. This rationale is reminiscent of the theory
underpinning Swift v. TysonZ2 -- the now-repudiated notion that the
law was "the law," unchanging and subject to only one proper
interpretation.2 21 Yet the remnants of that theory remain within the
condemnation of forum shopping by suggesting that the potential for
different outcomes is due to improper forum shopping rather than
recognizing that the potential for different outcomes is inherent
within our system of government.
The differences in state law are real-and the differences are
expressly authorized by our form of government.22 2 These differences
219. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1507; see also Cameron & Johnson,

supra note 57, at 825-28 (employing a more limited sample of Supreme Court decisions,
and concluding "the study suggests, at a bare minimum, that jurisdictional rules may have

an impact on the substantive outcome of cases"); Clermont & Eisenberg, supra, at 1508
("Venue is worth fighting over because outcome often turns on forum."); Frederick N.
Egler, Jr., The Fine Art of Forum Shopping, LAW. J., June 18, 1999, 4, 4 ("As most
courtroom veterans know, how a case ends is often determined by how it begins. Of the
many considerations which surround commencement of a civil action, none is more

important than the choice of forum.").
220. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
221. Ronald Dworkin refers to this concept as "mechanical jurisprudence."
[The nominalists] think that when we speak of 'the law' we mean a set of timeless
rules stocked in some conceptual warehouse awaiting discovery by judges, and that
when we speak of legal obligation we mean the invisible chains these mysterious
rules somehow drape around us. The theory that there are such rules and chains
they call 'mechanical jurisprudence,' and they are right in ridiculing its

practitioners .... A superficial examination of our practices is enough to show
[that] we speak of laws changing and evolving, and of legal obligation sometimes
being problematical. In these and other ways we show that we are not addicted to
mechanical jurisprudence.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 15-16 (1978).
222. See Ryan, supra note 37, at 201 (noting that a potential "explanation for the
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in state law can and often do result in different outcomes.
Accordingly, there is not merely one "right" result; the correct result
will depend, at least in some cases, on the applicable law. With the
litigation outcome potentially at stake, the lawyer must research
which forums are lawfully and legitimately available, and, if a choice
of forums exists, she must select the forum that will further her
client's interests. Perhaps the particular approbation reserved for
choices made due to differences in the law reflects disquiet at the notso-secret point that there isn't one path to-or definition of-justice.
C.

The "ManipulableJustice" Myth

Some find forum shopping as a litigation strategy offensive due
to the implication that justice is thereby susceptible to strategy and
manipulation. Surely we can all relate to this concern, but perhaps
this initial reaction briefly blinds us to the reality that this is merely a
variant of the prior two assumptions.
To say that our system of justice is subject to manipulation
(although phrased in a pejorative manner, to be sure) is simply to
acknowledge that more than one legitimate forum may be available
and that laws vary from state to state. The so-called "manipulation"
is, in actuality, merely the ability to choose among legitimate options,
and thus is an extension of the "one proper forum" and "one proper
law" myths.
The perceived importance of uniformity and nonmanipulability
derives from a popular version of legal positivism that sees the
law as clearly and fully established by identifiable social rules
....
Within the positivist framework, the set of valid rules
exhaustively describes legal rights and duties, and judicial
decisions outside these rules are purely discretionary and
extralegal.223
Despite understanding that lawyers often have legitimate choices
regarding where to litigate, and despite understanding that laws vary
from state to state, thus affording the potential for differences in
outcome, harsh reactions to forum shopping continue.
The
contradictions inherent in our legal system are especially pronounced
in forum shopping, because the very act of selection takes notice of
differences in laws, rules, and court systems. In addition, there is an
insistence that justice requires impartiality, fairness, and
toleration-or encouragement-of forum shopping is federalism").
223. Note, supra note 23, at 1685.
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consistency 224-even though those idealistic attributes are far from
fully integrated into all aspects of law and the legal system.2 5 When
laws vary from state to state, results may differ depending on the

forum.

When procedures and deadlines vary, results may differ

depending on the forum. In close cases, results may differ depending

on the forum. Forum shopping reminds us of these inconsistencies: a
reminder of truths that many would rather ignore.
A more plausible, if more cynical, explanation for the current
resistance to forum shopping can be found in the sphere of politics.
The recent debates draw on resistance to plaintiffs' lawyers and are
226
driven, at least in part, by defendant-oriented political interests.
Often overlooked in the political debates are countermeasures
available to defendants, such as removal, the opportunity to bring a
venue transfer motion, and the defendant's virtually complete control

over the choice of forum in cases implicating a forum selection
clause,227 as well as other benefits to defendants more generally.

[E]ven if forum shopping is relatively pro-plaintiff, it would be
unrealistic to see it as a deviation from some baseline of

neutrality.

Other aspects of our system are distinctly pro-

defendant and tend to counterbalance the pro-plaintiff
attributes of forum shopping. That forum shopping may
224. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 75 (1983) ("Insofar
as the law has an implicit economic structure, it must be rational; it must treat like cases
alike."); Note, supra note 23, at 1685 (noting that "[c]onsistency of outcomes is a
fundamental tenet of virtually any legal system").
225. See J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS, at x (1986)
(noting "the American habit of shopping for favorable laws, first in local legislatures, then
in Congress, and finally in courts"); see also Note, supra note 23, at 1686 (noting that
"dominant American legal ideology continues to deny the political aspects of law"); id.
("Squeamishness about forum shopping ... can be seen as part of society's continuing
unwillingness to abandon its transparently unfulfillable ideal of the pure rule of law.").
226. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Complex Litigation Project's Tort Choice-of-Law
Rules, 54 LA. L. REV. 907, 916 (1994) (noting that "[a]gitation for 'tort reform' has
produced a motley array of laws lobbied by powerful and well-organized special interest
groups" and has led to, among other things, "arbitrary caps on damages, stunted limitation
periods, [and] 'statutes of repose' that ban actions before they arise"); Michael L. Rustad,
Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Workers and
Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 724 (1996) (noting that "[t]he lobbying campaign by
tort reform special interest groups has been especially effective in the states"); Georgene
M. Vairo, Class Action FairnessAct of 2005 1 (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-

22, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=806405 ("The political nature of [the Class
Action Fairness Act] cannot be disputed.").
227. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding
a standard forum selection clause appearing in small print on the back of a cruise ship

ticket); see also Brown, supra note 17, at 688 (noting that the Supreme Court "has taken a
markedly pro-defendant stance" with respect to forum selection clauses).
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marginally assist plaintiffs is certainly no more unfair than the
fact that litigation costs present barriers to plaintiffs. The
policy against forum shopping does not eliminate unfair
2 28
advantages within the legal system.
Measures such as the current proposed congressional legislation
seek to change the rules of the forum game by circumscribing
plaintiffs' forum options. 2 9 The proposed legislation, however, would
merely exchange one perceived imbalance for another. Placing a
congressional "thumb on the scales" does not create equality, 2 0 but
instead merely shifts the power to the other side due to the zero-sum
nature of the forum game. There is no such thing as leveling the
playing field in litigation. 231 The inability to-and perhaps the actual
undesirability of-striking a perfect balance for both sides at every
moment in litigation leads to choices, and our system creates lawful
forum choices while simultaneously creating lawful counterbalances
for those circumstances when initial forum choices are genuinely
unfair.
Of course, the law is not static and shifts in policy can be the
motivation for legal reform.2 3 2 However, the criticisms of forum
228. Note, supra note 23, at 1688-89; see id. at 1689 n.91 (noting that "[a]spects of the
legal system that are biased toward, or generally improve the position of, the defendant
include the cost, time, and informational barriers to access to the legal system, difficulties
in obtaining proof that may be in the defendant's possession, and, in some cases, the slow
progress of legislatures in enacting remedies for widely-perceived wrongs").
229. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act of 2005, now pending in Congress).
230. The notion of "leveling the playing field" is more of the same forum game.
"Leveling" the playing field suggests, of course, that an imbalance exists-an imbalance
created by the availability of choices that potentially may affect the outcome, thus bringing
us back to the "one proper forum" and "one proper result" myths. A "level playing field,"
like the other myths discussed in this section, is the chasing of a chimera. There isn't one
proper result. Parties litigate cases precisely because the outcome is uncertain-because
the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s) do not see only one possible outcome (or at least do
not see the same sole possible outcome). The potential differences in outcome resulting
from forum selection have nothing to do with cheating or unfairness, and instead have
everything to do with our system of government, which gives each of our fifty states
constitutionally-authorized lawmaking powers. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying
text (discussing federalism concerns).
231. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 71 (1991) ("It would be
comforting to believe that taking a litigational advantage from plaintiffs simply levels the
playing field. But we have seen that litigation has little neutral ground. A single litigation
is a zero-sum game.").
232. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 915, 919 (1995) (documenting welfare reform package as a "dramatic shift in
national policy"); Iris Geva-May & Allan Maslove, What Prompts Health Care Policy
Changes? On Political Power Contests and Reform of Health Care Systems (The Case of
Canadaand Israel), 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 717, 727 (2000) (noting that, generally
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shopping are not formulated in terms of shifts in policy. Arguments
are not posed in terms of the desired ability to shift the balance in
favor of corporate interests and against individuals harmed by those
corporations. 233 Forum shopping is characterized as a form of
cheating rather than a legitimate, authorized option. The blatant
inaccuracy of this characterization demands correction-and if the
underlying motive is to shift policies to favor corporate defendants,
this underlying motive should be stated directly and publicly.
VI. FEDERALISM CONCERNS INHERENT IN ATTEMPTS To RESTRICT

THE FORUM GAME

Thus far, this Article has discussed the kinds of choices that
constitute forum shopping, legal and ethical guidance, and the
consistency of forum shopping with the economic theories of rational
choice and game theory. This Article has argued that the availability
of more than one lawfully-authorized forum creates legitimate choice,
and that lawyers ethically and rationally are compelled to seek the
most favorable forum to further their clients' interests. Every
available indication is that forum shopping is a legitimate practice.
But what if, nevertheless, Congress acts to limit the availability of,
and to sanction the practice of, forum shopping? It is to this potential
forum game that this final Part turns.
Calls for tort reform manifest themselves in periodic
congressional proposals, variants of which emerge on a regular basis.
As noted at the outset of this Article, one current proposal seeks to
sanction forum shopping234 and to federalize venue by limiting forum
speaking, some reform occurs in response to a crisis, and other reform through "slowly
emerging, incremental policy shifts").
233. See Timothy L. O'Brien & Jonathan D. Glater, Robin Hoods or Legal Hoods?,
The Government Takes Aim at a Class-Action Powerhouse, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, at
Al (noting that class actions have been the subject of "partisan legislative battles for more
than a decade," and that "Republicans, heavily financed by corporate coffers, have sought
to rein in the plaintiffs' bar"); see also Michele Heller, Next in Line on Senate Panel, a
"Catalyst" for Bills, Deals, AM. BANKER, June 3, 2005, at 4 (noting that the Class Action
Fairness Act "mov[es] more cases from state to federal courts, which generally pose higher
hurdles for plaintiffs"); Phillip Morris Sued for False Advertising, KAN. CITY STAR, July

26, 2005, at D16 (reporting that "[blusiness interests lobbied heavily for the [Class Action
Fairness Act] ....Federal courts are generally seen as less hospitable to class actions than
state courts.").
234. The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005 would amend Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to return the rule to its 1983 version. See H.R. REP. No. 109-123,
§ 2, (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cig-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109cong-bills&docid=f:h420rh.txt.pdf. Interestingly, the 1983 version of Rule 11 was widely
regarded as ineffectual. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1933 (1989) (stating that,
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options in both federal and state court.235 Overlooked in Congress's
zeal are several important considerations.
Federalizing venue eliminates choices created by the states
themselves. Congress should undertake to subvert intentionally
crafted state legislation only with the utmost caution, and only under
compelling circumstances.
The Constitution expressly limits
Congress's incursions into states' powers to those specifically
enumerated.2 36
The drafters of the Constitution were faced with two competing

with respect to the 1983 version of Rule 11, which provided for mandatory sanctions, "so
long as abuses at which Rule 11 is directed are defined to include papers deemed legally
frivolous, the detection of violations will be as determinate, and hence as uniform, as the
notion of frivolousness itself"); Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 477, 516 (2004) (noting that the 1983 version of Rule 11, providing for mandatory
sanctions, contained the potential for chilling vigorous advocacy and stating that, "[m]any
lawyers were so chilled in the 1980s and early 1990s: A 1980s American Judicature Society
study found that almost one-third of lawyers representing civil rights plaintiffs reported
that they had declined a present a claim they believed to be meritorious"); Melissa L.
Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule li-Some "Chilling" Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1324 (1986)
(discussing the 1983 version of Rule 11, setting forth empirical information, and
concluding that "[a]ggressive use of Rule 11 sanctions to punish lawyers threatens to chill
vigorous advocacy and restrict access to the courts in ways that do not appear to have been
intended by the drafters").
[The 1983 version of Rule 11 was] designed to reduce the number of frivolous
lawsuits and motions, by requiring the lawyer to refrain from taking positions that
reasonable investigation would have shown to be unfounded. The goal appears
modest enough, and laudable. Yet the threat of sanctions may deter not only
frivolous cases, but also potentially meritorious cases from being filed and
pursued.
Nelken, supra, at 1340. The Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005 would render sanctions
mandatory rather than discretionary, would eliminate the twenty-one day safe harbor, and
would extend Rule 1l's reach to include "any civil action in State court . .. affect[ing]
interstate commerce." H.R 420 §§ 2-3 (2005), availableat http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov
/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_congbills&docid=f:h420rh.txt.pdf; see also H.R. Rep.
109-123, at 4 (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db
name=109_congreports&docid=f:hr123.109.pdf (expressly noting the intent of the
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act to eliminate the twenty-one-day safe harbor); McMillion,
supra note 14, at 62 ("If passed, the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act would replace judicial
discretion with mandatory sanctions against attorneys for frivolous filings in federal cases
and eliminate the safe harbor provision.").
235. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (setting forth the pertinent provisions of
the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005); see also McMillion, supra note 14, at 62
(noting that the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act "also would apply those Rule 11 provisions
to civil cases related to interstate commerce that are in state courts").
236. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
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considerations. On one hand, the framers sought to establish a
government that was strong enough to serve certain important
purposes. On the other hand, they were concerned about the
potential dangers of centralizing too much power at the
national level, fearing that such a concentration would unduly
reduce the authority of the state governments and generally
threaten the liberty of the citizenry.
In an effort to
accommodate both concerns, the drafters created a federal
government of enumerated powers and, in the tenth
amendment, reserved all residual authority to the states.
Madison emphasized this point in The Federalist No. 46, noting
that under the Constitution, "all the more domestic and
personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided
for" by the state governments. In other words, the existence of
the federal government was not intended to change the legal
incidents and consequences of normal, day-to-day relationships
between citizens.237
Over time, Congress learned it could skirt this limitation by
interpreting broadly its power to regulate interstate commerce.238
[F]or much of the late 20th century Congress has been able to
do almost anything under an expansive reading of the power to
regulate interstate commerce. The durability of this expansive
reading of the commerce power owes a great deal to the
prestige of the civil rights acts of the 1960s, upheld as a
legitimate congressional regulation of interstate commerce.
Thankfully, few modern lawyers wish to argue that federal
antidiscrimination law exceeds congressional authority. And,
perhaps as a consequence, until recently modern courts have by
and large accepted the truism that almost any activity,
anywhere, potentially affects interstate commerce and is subject
to congressional regulation, provided that Congress makes a
symbolic gesture at its potential interstate effects.239
The proposed congressional legislation currently pending
invokes interstate commerce with respect to extending Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 to apply to state court, as well as federal court,
237. Maltz, supra note 16, at 239.
238. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
239. Richard Thompson Ford, The New Blue Federalists, SLATE, Jan. 6, 2005,
http://slate.msn.com/id/2111942.
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proceedings, 4 0 but does not take such care with the venue provision.
Even assuming, however, that the interstate commerce clause can
constitutionally support the federalization of venue, the more
important question is whether Congress should take such a step.24'
Congressional tinkering with forum selection stomps squarely on
states' toes. Congress should tread more carefully.
The congressional proposal to limit forum options is founded on
a misguided underlying premise-the assumption that there is only
one proper result, which is a corollary of the "one proper forum" and
"one proper law" myths explored earlier. Restricting forum options
is, of course, aimed at limiting forum shopping and assumes that such
forum limitations will ensure consistent verdicts, which in turn
assumes that there is one proper result. As we have seen, however, if
the law provides for more than one legitimate forum, and if different
states legitimately have different laws due to our governmental
structure, these different laws potentially will lead to different
outcomes, at least in some circumstances. The notion of "one proper
result" is an erroneous premise in light of the potential differences in
the applicable law, the vagaries of fact investigation and discovery,
the potential for lawyer error or poor tactical choices, and the
necessity in fully litigated cases for formal factfinding-factual
determinations that shape both liability and damage outcomes.
Accordingly, the proposal reflects Congress's attempt to declare that
there is one proper result, when one proper result does not, and
cannot, exist.
If congressional action were necessary in order to remedy flaws
240. See H.R. 420, 109th Cong. § 3, (2005), availableat http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/

cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong.bills&docid=f:h420rh.txt.pdf.
In any civil action in State court, the court, upon motion, shall determine within 30
days after the filing of such motion whether the action affects interstate commerce.
Such court shall make such determination based on an assessment of the costs to
the interstate economy, including the loss of jobs, were the relief requested
granted. If the court determines such action substantially affects interstate
commerce, the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall
apply to such action.
Id.
241. See Ford, supra note 239 ("Sensible federalism has its limits: It must not allow
states to limit the enjoyment of important rights, and it must allow for federal regulation
of activities with significant interstate effects."); see also McMillion, supra note 14, at 62
(reporting that the American Bar Association opposes the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act
of 2005 "because it seeks to circumvent the process for amending federal court procedures
set forth in the Rules Enabling Act. The ABA also opposes the bill on grounds that it
would violate principles of federalism by imposing the changes in Rule 11 on certain cases
filed in state courts.").
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within the practice of forum shopping, the proposed legislation could
be justified. But this is not the case. Instead, congressional proposals
would take extreme action in an area where procedures and remedies
are already in place to correct genuine abuses. "Cheaters" certainly
can create problems-that is a truism applicable in every area.
Forum shopping, however, is not in and of itself "cheating," and the
broad-brush attack on forum shopping is merely an ill-disguised
attempt to shift the existing litigation balances to favor defendants.
The states clearly do not believe congressional intervention is
necessary. Obvious remedies are available if states believe that
litigants are illegitimately filing lawsuits in their state to tap into more
favorable law. States can amend their long-arm statutes to exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants under narrower,
more limited circumstances. States can enact more restrictive venue
statutes. States can shorten limitations periods, restrict remedies, and
cap damages. If states have not chosen to take these steps, it would
appear that they do not view forum shopping within their state as a
significant issue.
Absent significant, widespread state concern,
Congress should refrain from such an overreaching intrusion into
states' constitutionally-authorized lawmaking powers.
CONCLUSION

The attempt to criticize and trivialize forum selection through the
label of forum "shopping" misapprehends the forum game by treating
forum selection as a parlor trick-as unfair and abusive-rather than
as a lawful, authorized strategy. Forum shopping is not a form of
"cheating" by those who refuse to play by the rules. Playing by the
rules includes the ability of plaintiff's counsel to select-and defense
counsel to attempt to counter-the set of rules by which the litigation
"game" will be played. The availability of more than one legallyauthorized forum results in legitimate choice, and lawyers ethically
are compelled to seek the most favorable forum to further their
clients' interests. Selecting the most favorable forum is a rational
strategy under law and economics' rational choice theory and game
theory. The widespread criticism of forum shopping simply does not
withstand scrutiny. Accordingly, current congressional proposals
aimed at limiting and sanctioning forum shopping unnecessarily
threaten to intrude upon states' legitimate, constitutionally-conferred
lawmaking powers.
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